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CREATING CAUTIONARY TALES:
INSTITUTIONAL, JUDICIAL, AND SOCIETAL
INDIFFERENCE TO THE LIVES OF
INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS
Nicole B. Godfrey*
INTRODUCTION
It has long been said that a society’s worth can be judged by
taking stock of its prisons. That is all the truer in this pandemic,
where inmates everywhere have been rendered vulnerable and
often powerless to protect themselves from harm. May we hope
that our country’s facilities serve as models rather than
cautionary tales.1
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, issued the above-quoted clarion call to protect the lives
of incarcerated people on May 14, 2020.2 At that point, the
COVID-19 pandemic had brought American society to a
standstill for a little more than two months, and it had begun to
wreak havoc on American prisons nationwide.3 Despite Justice
*

Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Special
thanks to Rebecca Aviel, John Bliss, Bernard Chao, Alan Chen, Ian Farrell, César
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Sam Kamin, Tamara Kuennen, Margaret Kwoka, Kevin
Lynch, Viva Moffatt, Govind Persad, and Laura Rovner for their insight on a very early
version of this Article. I also want to thank Benjamin Barton, Mira Edmonds, Fanna Gamal,
Randy Hertz, Zina Makar, and Maneka Sinha for their feedback on an earlier draft of this
piece presented at the 2020 Clinical Law Review Writers’ Workshop. Finally, I want to
thank Sara Hildebrand, Tamara Kuennen, Jesse Loper, Sarah Matsumoto, and Tania N.
Valdez for their thoughtful feedback and encouragement as this piece moved into its final
form. Additional thanks to the editors of the Arkansas Law Review for their careful
proofreading and edits. All errors are my own.
1. Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598, 1601 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., statement
respecting the denial of application to vacate stay).
2. See id.
3. Greg Stohr, Supreme Court Rejects Texas Inmates on Covid-19 Prevention (1),
BLOOMBERG L. (May 14, 2020, 6:00 PM), [https://perma.cc/7CZF-FSCJ] (noting that more
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Sotomayor’s hopes that the nation’s prisons might avoid
becoming cautionary tales, the realities of and legal doctrines
governing the American system of mass incarceration all-butinsured that American prisons would become a site of mass
casualty to the COVID-19 pandemic. This Article explains why.
Let’s start by looking at how the pandemic impacted one
prison—Arkansas’s Cummins Unit—among the nation’s
approximately 2,000.4 Established in 1902, the Cummins Unit is
an Arkansas prison that sits on nearly 18,000 acres of farmland
that used to be a cotton plantation.5 Built to incarcerate 1,876
men, the prison confines 1,950 today.6 The men incarcerated at
Cummins work in all manner of prison jobs; some work the fields
in a manner all-too reminiscent of the slaves who worked the
plantations during the antebellum era.7 More than 100 men living
in the Cummins Unit go to work each day as part of what is known
as the “Hoe Squad.”8 Unpaid, these men “pile into an open
trailer” each morning, sitting side-by-side, “shoulder to shoulder,
hip to hip” as “a tractor pulls them deep into the prison’s fields”
where they “pull weeds, dig ditches, and pick cotton, cucumbers,

than 20,000 incarcerated people had been infected and more than 300 had died at that point
in the pandemic).
4. HOMER VENTERS, LIFE AND DEATH IN RIKERS ISLAND 9 (2019) (noting that “[t]here
are currently about 3,000 jails and 2,000 prisons in the United States”).
5. Molly Minta, Incarcerated, Infected, and Ignored: Inside an Arkansas Prison
Outbreak, THE NATION (June 17, 2020), [https://perma.cc/L7L9-2D5B]. Like many states
in the South, Arkansas used the post-Reconstruction era to repurpose its antebellum-era slave
plantations into prisons that would set the stage for the continued subjugation of Black
people. See, e.g., CALEB SMITH, THE PRISON AND THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION 136 (2009)
(“In the aftermath of Reconstruction and the Civil War amendments, Southern states
dismantled the old structure and recomposed its elements into a kind of hybrid, the ‘prison
farm,’ at sites like Angola, Cummins, and Parchman.”).
6. Minta, supra note 5.
7. See Rachel Aviv, Punishment by Pandemic, THE NEW YORKER (June 15, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/37EY-X3KT] (describing the unpaid labor of the “Hoe Squad” and the
patrol provided by the “field riders”). While today the “field riders” patrol is made up of
“officers on horseback,” id., Arkansas ran its prisons using a “trusty” system until well into
the 1960s. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
313 (1993). The “trusty” system allowed Arkansas to inexpensively run its prisons by
granting power to certain “favorite[]” incarcerated people who would be charged with
overseeing the rest of the incarcerated population. Id. (“In Cummins prison, in Arkansas,
for example, there were ‘only 35 free world employees’ for ‘slightly less than 1,000 men.’
This was a cheap way to run a prison, but hardly enlightened penology.”) (footnote omitted).
8. Aviv, supra note 7.
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and watermelons.”9 When one man asked an officer why the men
working the fields had to use “gardening tools rather than modern
farming technology,” the prison official told him, “[w]e don’t
want your brain. We want your back.”10 After returning from the
fields or other warehouse jobs, the incarcerated men live in open
barracks, with beds that are about three feet apart.11 Prison
officials send them to the chow hall “three to four barracks’ worth
of men” at a time.12 In short, the men living in the Cummins Unit
are forced to live and work in extremely close quarters—an
environment ripe to incubate any highly infectious disease like
COVID-19.13
By early-to-mid March 2020, prison officials knew that,
before long, the coronavirus would enter the Cummins Unit,
infecting a large swath of the incarcerated population, yet still
insisted that the Hoe Squad report to work in the crowded trailer
without any safety precautions.14 As the men living in Cummins
Unit learned of the COVID-19 pandemic and its risks in late
March, some refused to report to work.15 In response, the prison
disciplined them,16 even though by the time of the work strike,
“Asa Hutchinson, the governor of Arkansas, had asked that
businesses cease ‘nonessential functions.’”17 Meanwhile, in
seeming recognition of the coming impact of the pandemic on the
prison, the director of Arkansas’s prisons instructed the facility
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Minta, supra note 5 (describing how one incarcerated person, who is 5’9”, was able
to touch the beds next to him when laying on his back and extending his arms outward).
12. Id.
13. Martin Kaste, Prisons and Jails Worry About Becoming Coronavirus ‘Incubators,’
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/RHJ5-W3DF].
14. Minta, supra note 5. By late March, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) issued interim guidance meant to assist prison officials seeking to protect
the health and safety of incarcerated persons, prison staff, and the general public. See CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON MANAGEMENT OF
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) IN CORRECTIONAL AND DETENTION FACILITIES
(Mar. 27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/86QN-UTAQ]. That interim guidance included a
direction about the importance of personal hygiene, social distancing, and masks in the
prevention and management of COVID-19 cases. Id. at 3, 10.
15. Aviv, supra note 7 (describing how the group of men assigned to the “Hoe Squad”
lay down on their beds when officers called their names for work).
16. Id. (recounting that the “men were disciplined for ‘unexcused absence’—a
violation that carries a punishment of up to fifteen days in isolation”).
17. Id.
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wardens to “prepare a portion/area of [their] punitive isolation
areas to house inmates effected by the CoronaVirus,”18 and the
incarcerated people required to work in Cummins’s garment
factory began to “manufacture masks that would be distributed
throughout the state’s prison system.”19
This contradictory behavior on the part of prison officials
continued even after the first Cummins staff member tested
positive for the virus on April 1, 2020.20 Despite the positive test,
prison officials did not administer mass tests to Cummins’s
incarcerated population, nor did they track “which or how many
of its employees had tested positive.”21 Even when incarcerated
people began exhibiting symptoms of COVID-19, the prison
failed to take steps to limit an outbreak.22 Instead, prison officials
ignored the complaints of symptomatic people, all but
guaranteeing the rapid spread of the virus among the incarcerated
population.23 For example, on April 10, 2020, a man incarcerated
at Cummins “went to the infirmary with a severe headache and
other symptoms he feared were signs of Covid-19.”24 After
informing prison officials that he had a “real bad case of diarrhea”
and had lost his senses of smell and taste, prison officials gave
him two Tylenol and sent him back to his crowded barracks.25
Four days later, as the number of symptomatic prisoners
increased, Arkansas prison officials finally began mass testing at
Cummins.26 But even in the face of mass testing, prison officials
ignored public health guidance on necessary safety precautions to
limit the spread. For example, in one barracks, four nurses
administered forty-six tests without regularly changing their
gloves.27
Unsurprisingly, then, by April 25, 2020, 826

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Minta, supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Minta, supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
Aviv, supra note 7.
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incarcerated men and 33 staff members tested positive for the
virus.28
But prison officials did not inform all prisoners of their
positive result right away or take steps to quarantine infected
people. One person reported that after mass testing in his
barracks, “a sergeant later shouted into the barracks, ‘Y’all are
negative.’”29 This person, who noticed he could not smell
anything when another man “defecated a few feet away from
him,” remained skeptical and asked a family member to call the
prison to find out the true results of his test.30 “He was positive.”31
Despite the mass outbreak at Cummins, incarcerated people,
former staff members, and current staff members reported a
shocking level of indifference to the health of those infected.32
Former staff members confirmed a practice of shredding sick call
requests rather than responding to them,33 and current staff
members reported seeing prison grievances in bathroom trash
cans.34 One former nurse of the Arkansas prison system
confirmed: “[t]he mentality of the infirmary is: these individuals
are worthless.”35 One incarcerated person, twenty-nine-year-old
Derick Coley, saw a nurse at Cummins on April 15; the nurse
“noted that he was too weak to walk and his blood-oxygen level
was ninety, which would typically indicate that a patient should
be hospitalized.”36 Rather than send Mr. Coley to the hospital,
the nurse sent him “to the Hole, where he remained for seventeen
days. His vitals were never recorded again.”37 The men confined
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Aviv, supra note 7.
33. Id.
34. Id. A grievance is a formal complaint lodged by an incarcerated person related to
conditions within a carceral facility. An incarcerated person is required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court.
See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). Exhaustion generally requires the filing of a
grievance using the prison system’s requirements and following the prison system’s
procedures through to completion. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006) (cautioning
that “the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion” as defined by
administrative law).
35. Aviv, supra note 7.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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next to Mr. Coley in the segregation unit begged staff to take him
to the infirmary because he couldn’t breathe, but staff members
just kept walking by his cell, ignoring him.38 When officers
finally came to his cell—“not to check on him but to clear it so
that someone else could move in”—Mr. Coley collapsed.39
Prison officials handcuffed him, placed him in a wheelchair, and
took him to the infirmary, where he “was ‘worked on and then
passed away,’” according to the coroner’s report.40 At the time
of his death, the prison had no doctor on duty, so the infirmary
staff called the doctor on call, William Patrick Scott, whose
“medical license ha[d] been suspended three times.”41
Unfortunately, Mr. Coley’s story is neither unique to him, to
the Cummins Unit, or to the Arkansas prison system. By May 3,
2020, just one month after the first Cummins staff member tested
positive for COVID-19, four incarcerated people had died of
COVID-19 complications and nearly half of the incarcerated
population tested positive for the disease.42 By June 9, 2020, just
a month later, eleven people had died in the Cummins Unit
alone,43 and by September 2020, thirty-nine people had died
throughout the Arkansas prison system.44 By July 1, 2021, 11,425
people incarcerated in Arkansas prisons had contracted COVID19, and fifty-two people had died.45 Across the country, 398,627
people incarcerated in American prisons have contracted
COVID-19, and 2,715 people have died.46
Prisons across the country have faced outbreaks like the
outbreak at Cummins. At the Marion Correctional Institution in

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Aviv, supra note 7.
41. Id.
42. 4 Cummins Unit Inmates Die Due to COVID-19, 4029 NEWS (May 3, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/TUF8-74JB] (noting the deaths of four incarcerated people at Cummins);
see also Frazier v. Kelley, 460 F. Supp. 3d 799, 811 (E.D. Ark. 2020) (finding that 856
people (of the 1,950) in Cummins contracted COVID by April 27, 2020).
43. Anna Stitt, COVID-19 Inside Arkansas Prisons: The Death of Derick Coley,
KUAR (June 9, 2020), [https://perma.cc/GBX5-E93Z].
44. John Moritz, Virus Deaths at 39 in State’s Prisons; 11 Inmates Were Eligible for
Parole, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Sept. 8, 2020), [https://perma.cc/HVM6-J5RT].
45. A State-by-State Look at 15 Months of Coronavirus in Prisons, THE MARSHALL
PROJECT, [https://perma.cc/6AK9-RF37], (July 1, 2021, 1:00 PM).
46. Id.
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Ohio, more than 80% of the incarcerated population tested
positive for COVID-19.47 In Wisconsin, nearly 8% of the
incarcerated population—more than 6,700 people—in the state
Department of Corrections contracted COVID-19 by November
2020.48 By June 2021, that number had risen to 10,989 people
(one in two) in Wisconsin’s prisons, a rate four times greater than
the rate in Wisconsin overall.49 In all, the COVID-19 case rate
for incarcerated people reached 5.5 times higher than the national
case rate in the United States by June 2020.50 Incarcerated people
have faced a mortality rate that is 45% higher than the overall
rate.51
In addition to the illness and death that accompanies an
outbreak, conditions in prisons that are experiencing an outbreak
are often abysmal. For example, at Sterling Correctional Facility
in Colorado, outbreaks have been accompanied by extensive
lockdowns, during which incarcerated people are locked down in
their cells without access to showers or the bathroom.52 At times,
these lockdowns last seventy-two hours without access to a
shower and with limited meals.53 Colorado is not alone in
utilizing lockdowns as a tool to manage the pandemic in its
prisons.54 Moreover, in those facilities facing rampant infection
rates, incarcerated people who fall ill are not receiving the care
47. Jenny E. Carroll, Pretrial Detention in the Time of Covid-19, 115 NW. UNIV. L.
REV. 59, 63 (2020) (noting that health experts warned “that the contagion ha[d] begun to
spread to the communities surrounding the prison where guards and other staff live”).
48. Rich Kremer, More Than 8 Percent of State’s Prison Population Currently Infected
with COVID-19, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Nov. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/VWD4-UDZ9].
49. THE MARSHALL PROJECT, supra note 45. For comparison, the infection rate for
the incarcerated population in Arkansas is 5.7 times the rate in Arkansas overall, while the
rate in Ohio’s prisons is 2.1 times the overall rate for the state. Id.
50. Brendan Saloneret et al., COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in Federal and State
Prisons, JAMA NETWORK (July 8, 2020), [https://perma.cc/FK6M-23ZV].
51. Moe Clark, Vaccination Rates in Colorado Prisons Remain Low as COVID-19
Cases Spike Across the State, COLO. NEWSLINE (Aug. 3, 2021), [https://perma.cc/Q6PT29Z2].
52. Moe Clark, ‘It Was Just Chaos’: Former Sterling Prison Guard Says COVID
Protocols Were Not Enforced, COLO. NEWSLINE (Nov. 12, 2020), [https://perma.cc/6YCFBW6C].
53. Id.
54. See Nicole B. Godfrey & Laura L. Rovner, COVID-19 in American Prisons:
Solitary Confinement is Not the Solution, 2 ARIZ. ST. L.J. ONLINE 127, 135-36 (2020) (noting
that prison systems are turning to solitary confinement to address the harms posed by the
COVID-19 pandemic).
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necessary to adequately treat COVID-19 and its attendant
comorbidities.55 In short, American prisons have become
cautionary tales in both their lack of preparation and their
response to the pandemic, at a cost of thousands of lives and the
untold suffering of hundreds of thousands of incarcerated people.
This Article posits that American prisons were doomed to be
cautionary tales from the start of the pandemic due to three
interwoven strands of indifference faced by incarcerated people
in this country. First, the sheer enormity of the American carceral
state56 has led to an institutional indifference to the lives of
incarcerated individuals.
American prisons are crowded,
57
unhygienic, and violent. Prison officials focus their energy on
security and control rather than rehabilitation and health.58 While
the past half century has seen a rapid expansion in incarceration,59
prison systems have done little to account for “the many ways in
which incarcerated people face new risks of injury, sickness, and
death behind bars. The deaths, injuries, sickness, and trauma
caused by incarceration” are wholly ignored.60 The COVID-19
pandemic has brought this institutional indifference to the fore
55. Carlos Franco-Paredes et al., Imprisoned on the COVID-19 Death Row, BMJ
BLOGS (Nov. 2, 2020), [https://perma.cc/RA8D-C9GJ] (noting that once incarcerated people
become ill, “they are unable to receive adequate and timely medical care”).
56. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 9 (“There are currently about 3,000 jails and 2,000
prisons in the United States.”).
57. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 47, at 73 (noting that “prisons are infamous for
overcrowding”); Andrew D. Leipold, Is Mass Incarceration Inevitable?, 56 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1579, 1580 (2019) (noting the overcrowding inherent to the American prison system);
Amanda Klonsky, An Epicenter of the Pandemic Will Be Jails and Prisons, if Inaction
Continues, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), [https://perma.cc/E8QD-5ESL] (explaining that
toilet tanks double as sinks “for hand washing, tooth brushing and other hygiene”).
58. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 6 (warning that “[h]ealth care is not a top priority in
prison” because “health systems in jail and prison are usually designed and controlled by
people who aren’t health experts”); see also id. at 2 (noting that prisons and jails “are
paramilitary settings, where the group that has the health data is usually under the control of
the security service”).
59. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1580 (recounting the “familiar” story of the U.S.
incarceration rate: “The United States incarcerates more people than anyone else in the
world, both in absolute terms and per capita. The United States has less than 5% of the
world’s population but 20% of the world’s prison inmates. There are 2.1 million people
behind bars in this country, which is almost one in every 100 adults. Many prisons are
overcrowded, at times unconstitutionally so. Given these facts, it is not surprising that the
phrase ‘mass incarceration’ is routinely used to describe the American approach to crime and
punishment.”).
60. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 3.
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and highlighted the myriad ways prisons as institutions ignore the
plight of the incarcerated.
Second, the muddled Eighth Amendment doctrine applied to
claims challenging prison conditions61 is the result of
overwhelming judicial indifference to the lives of the
incarcerated. This judicial indifference arises in part from the
overwhelming deference the judiciary affords to prison officials62
and in part from a misdirected focus on punishment—and a
concomitant focus on intent—in cases challenging prison
conditions.63 By examining the series of cases in which the
Supreme Court developed the modern Eighth Amendment
doctrine that is applied in prison conditions cases, I demonstrate
that the doctrine developed from an undue judicial concern in
61. Nicole B. Godfrey, Institutional Indifference, 98 OR. L. REV. 151, 153 (2020).
62. Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 140-43.
63. Id. at 137-40. Incarcerated people seeking to enjoin ongoing harms posed by prison
conditions must meet an exacting, two-part test colloquially known as the deliberate
indifference standard. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). First, the prisoner must
demonstrate that the condition being challenged is “sufficiently serious” in order to satisfy
the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Id. at 834. A sufficiently serious
condition is a condition that results in the deprivation of basic human needs, see Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981), like “food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and
reasonable safety.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200
(1989) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976)). Incarcerated people need not
wait for harm to befall them before seeking judicial relief from unsafe prison conditions—
the Supreme Court has made clear that the Eighth Amendment protects against the risk of
future harms. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). Second, in order to satisfy the
subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry, an incarcerated person must prove that
the person or entity being sued exhibited deliberate indifference to the serious condition
being challenged. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In other words, an incarcerated plaintiff must
prove that the defendant being sued knew of the risk posed by the challenged condition but
disregarded that knowledge by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the risk. Id. at
847.
In prior work, I have argued that application of this standard is nearly impossible in cases
seeking injunctive relief. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 153. In particular, I argued that the type
of proof necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference of an entity is unclear, and I
proposed the courts look to certain categories of proof to demonstrate the entity’s knowledge
of the risks posed by a challenged condition. Id. at 186-95. Here, I seek to build upon this
prior work by examining how the federal courts arrived at the deliberate indifference
standard for prison conditions claims. In so examining, I demonstrate that the standard grew
out of an undue focus on the word “punishments” in the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and
unusual punishments clause. By focusing too much on the word “punishment,” the Court
ignored the reality that incarceration is the punishment at issue in conditions case. The only
true question before the Court in a conditions case is whether the conditions at issue in a
particular prison are such that incarceration has become an unconstitutional punishment.
See infra Part II.
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protecting prison officials at the expense of incarcerated lives.
The net result of this undue protection of prison officials is that
courts are willing to leave horrific prison conditions undisturbed
so as to avoid prison officials’ liability.64
Finally, the reason that the institutional and judicial
indifferences described above have been allowed to proliferate is
a general societal indifference to the lives of the incarcerated. In
part, this indifference is just a continuation of the societal
indifference to the poor and minorities, traditionally disfavored
groups who are disproportionately entangled in the American
criminal system.65 But societal indifference to the incarcerated
also stems from a general attitude that prison should be harsh
because incarcerated people deserve the cruelty they experience
in American prison systems.66 Compounding these attitudes,
American prison systems are notoriously resistant to
transparency,67 leaving the American public with little idea of
what really goes on behind prison walls.68
64. See infra Part II.
65. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1582 (noting that “high levels of imprisonment
disproportionately affect the poor and minorities” and positing that “criminal justice policies
. . . are created and enforced because they have this effect—imprisonment as a form of social
control of disfavored groups.”); see also James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead:
Warehouse Prisons, Paradigm Change, and the Supreme Court, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1003,
1063 (1997) (hypothesizing that the “warehouse prison” reflects a “paradigm shift” that
“changed the target of punishment from the body of the offender to his personhood. By
subjecting inmates to coerced and regimented idleness, the warehouse prison signifies that
offenders are unworthy of activities imparting social value and self-esteem.”).
66. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1585 (noting that “[p]rison is harsh, but we have taken
most of the other punishment options (shaming, banishment, corporal) off the table, leaving
the remaining choices as either being inapplicable in many cases (economic sanctions,
restorative measures), too expensive (intensive rehabilitation), or not sufficiently harsh to
satisfy retributive or deterrence goals (community supervision, home confinement,
community service) . . . many believe that the harshness of incarceration is a feature rather
than a flaw—the worse the prison conditions, the greater the incentive for people to avoid
the underlying behavior.”).
67. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 10 (noting that “[t]he resistance to transparency [is the]
product of [both] the paramilitary nature of the setting [and the] role of litigation in
improving jail conditions.”).
68. See generally Shaila Dewan, Inside America’s Black Box: A Rare Look at the
Violence of Incarceration, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019), [https://perma.cc/23AB-FATR]
(discussing lack of transparency in American prisons); Nicole B. Godfrey, “Inciting a Riot”:
Silent Sentinels, Group Protests, and Prisoners’ Petition and Associational Rights, 43
SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 1113, 1114-15 (2020) (discussing the importance of hearing the
voices and stories of those living inside prison walls in discussions of criminal system
reform); Laura Rovner, On Litigating Constitutional Challenges to the Federal Supermax:
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This Article proceeds in three parts. First, the Article
describes the institutional indifference inherent to modern
American prison systems and how the modern, bureaucratic
prison state strips incarcerated people of their identities in an
effort to maintain its indifference. Part II provides a historical
overview of the text and purpose of the Eighth Amendment and a
survey of the cases creating the current Eighth Amendment
doctrine as applied to prison conditions. Through this survey,
Part II demonstrates that the current Eighth Amendment doctrine
is the result of an undue focus on the subjective intent of prison
officials rather than the harm experienced by prisoners. This part
concludes that this undue focus arises from long-standing judicial
indifference to incarcerated lives. Finally, Part III examines how
both the institutional and judicial indifferences described in Parts
I and II result from a general societal indifference to the lives of
the incarcerated. This Article concludes with a call for reform of
the American carceral system to overcome the institutional,
judicial, and societal indifference discussed to create a system that
is truly just.
I. INSTITUTIONAL INDIFFERENCE: THE
BUREAUCRATIC PRISON STATE
One of the inherent difficulties in talking about the American
prison system as an institution is that there is not one American
carceral system.69 Rather, each state and the federal government
operate separate systems of incarceration.70 However, there are
some common features that permeate each of these systems, and
it is those common features that create the institutional
indifference that made American prisons ripe for disaster when
the COVID-19 pandemic began.

Improving Conditions and Shining a Light, 95 DENV. L. REV. 457, 460-64 (2018) (discussing
the invisibility of prisons as compared to other aspects of the criminal system); Andrea C.
Armstrong, No Prisoner Left Behind? Enhancing Public Transparency of Penal Institutions,
25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 435, 462-66 (2014) (discussing problems inherent to the lack of
transparency in penal institutions).
69. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 162-63.
70. Id. at 163 (discussing the expansion of the federal and state prison systems in the
late-nineteenth to early-twentieth century).
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First, many prison systems are overcrowded and have been
for decades.71 Even those that are not operating at full or greater
than full capacity, are still crowded, even if not “overly” so.72
According to the Prison Policy Initiative, “41 states are currently
operating at 75% of their capacity, with at least nine of those state
prison systems and the federal Bureau of Prisons are still
operating at more than 100%. Only one state—Maine—has a
current prison population below 50% of their capacity.”73
Importantly, some prison systems have changed the way they
calculate their capacity in recent years.74 Rather than report their
capacity as a measurement of the number of prison beds
anticipated in the original design of a prison, these systems
instead report capacity as a measurement of the number of beds
that “can be squeezed into a facility.”75 But no matter the method
of measurement, one thing is certain: most American prisons
have nowhere near enough space “to allow for adequate social
distancing or medical isolation and quarantine.”76
Second, prison systems operate as paramilitary
bureaucracies where medical care, mental health care, education,
and housing classifications decisions are made in a manner that
fails to account for the incarcerated person as an individual.77 The
prison bureaucratic state allows prison systems to ignore systemic
problems by attributing tragic outcomes either to incarcerated
people themselves or “a few bad apples” among the prison staff.78
In the COVID-19 pandemic, the flaws in this approach are
obvious when one examines the individual stories of the men and
71. Emily Widra, Since You Asked: Just How Overcrowded Were Prisons before the
Pandemic, and at This Time of Social Distancing, How Overcrowded Are They Now?,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 21, 2020), [https://perma.cc/MQW5-2FDW] (noting that
nine states’ and the federal government’s prison systems “were operating at 100% capacity
or more” before the pandemic).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 41 (2015).
75. Id.
76. Widra, supra note 71.
77. See, e.g., VENTERS, supra note 4, at 20 (noting how the “paramilitary nature of
health care in jails and prisons” leads prison officials to “do [their] best to link the death [of
an incarcerated person] to a personal failing by the deceased patient or chalk it up to a few
bad apples when staff abuse or neglect is clearly implicated”); see also infra Section I.B.
78. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 20.

1 GODFREY.MAN.FIN COPY 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021

CREATING CAUTIONARY TALES

12/13/21 2:43 PM

377

women who have died in prison after being infected with the
coronavirus.79
Finally, prison systems operate to strip incarcerated people
from any sense of individualized identity by creating routinized
patterns of daily life.80 Endemic to this routinized system is a
tribalism that further solidifies the only identities that matter as
prison officials on the one hand and incarcerated people on the
other.81 This tribalism leads to an institutionalized unwillingness
to identify and reform systemic failures in order to protect the
health and safety of individual people who are incarcerated.82
The following three sections discuss each of these three
common features of American prisons and how those features
help create the institutionalized indifference inherent to systems
of incarceration in this country. Part I.A. discusses how America
grew to become the world leader in incarceration, locking up
more of its citizens than any other nation in the world. Part I.B.
then examines the bureaucratic prison state and how prison
bureaucracy normalizes indifference to serious harms suffered by
the incarcerated population. Finally, Part I.C. analyzes how the
purposeful stripping of identity that occurs in American prisons
perpetuates the institutional indifference to individual lives.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41 (discussing the death of Mr. Coley at
Cummins Unit); Mahita Gajanan, Federal Inmate Dies of Coronavirus After Giving Birth
While on Ventilator, TIME (Apr. 29, 2020), [https://perma.cc/E2UG-DR88] (describing the
plight of Andrea Circle Bear who died at a federal medical center in Fort Worth, Texas after
contracting the coronavirus); Jack Rodgers, Texas Geriatric Prison Ravaged by Virus
Dodges Injunction, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Nov. 16, 2020), [https://perma.cc/R746TG3Y] (recounting how nineteen incarcerated people died in 116 days in the Pack Unit in
Texas, including Alvin Norris, who died before prison officials “took any proactive measures
to suppress Covid-19 infections”); Lance Benzel, Before Dying of COVID-19, Sterling
Prison Inmate Deprived of Care, Former Resident Says, THE GAZETTE (May 23, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/7RRV-KTC8] (describing how eighty-six-year-old David Grosse had only
other incarcerated people to care for him in his final days in the prison’s ward for military
veterans and explaining that prison officials “declined to bring him to the clinic” because he
did not have a fever, despite that he was soiling himself and not eating).
80. Norval Morris, The Contemporary Prison: 1965-Present, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 227
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman, eds., 1995) (describing modern prisons as places of
“deadening routine punctuated by bursts of fear and violence” and places of “a relentlessly
unchanging, grimly gray routine”).
81. See VENTERS, supra note 4, at 10 (describing tribalism as a universal feature of
jails where correctional officers and inmates look out for their own).
82. See id. (describing prison tribalism as creating a system wherein allegiance to a
particular group supersedes the greater good, particularly in times of conflict or friction).
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A. Incarceration Nation

The United States first began to turn to incarceration as its
primary system of punishment in the decades following the
American Revolutionary War.83 This new mode of punishment
derived from a sense that society must separate its deviants in
order to root out the causes of crime, and most states opened at
least one penitentiary in the decades leading up to the Civil War.84
After the Civil War, states sought to design prisons that could
maximize the number of people confined while saving money on
administration.85 The results of this focus on maximizing prison
beds at the lowest possible monetary cost remains visible in
American prison systems today.
By the 1930s, most states and the federal government
operated prisons known colloquially as the “Big Houses” because
of the sheer number of men confined inside the prison gates.86
But within a few decades, those Big Houses proved insufficient
to house the country’s exploding prison population.87 Between
1970 and 1980, the prison population doubled; between 1981 and
1995, it doubled again.88 And the population growth continued,
creating the “story [that] is now sadly familiar. The United States
incarcerates more people than anyone else in the world, both in
absolute terms and per capita.”89 This population growth led to
severe overcrowding, leading prison officials to begin placing
two or three people into prison cells built for just one person.90
While recent years have begun to see a slight decrease in the

83. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 160-61.
84. See id.
85. Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965, in THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY,
supra note 80, at 170 (explaining that states constructing new penitentiaries were driven “by
how to confine the largest number of [people] at the lowest possible cost”).
86. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 163 n.61 (citing Rotman, supra note 85, at 185) (“Big
Houses were prisons that held, on average, 2,500 men, prisons such as San Quentin in
California, Sing Sing in New York, Stateville in Illinois, and Jackson in Michigan.”).
87. Morris, supra note 80, at 236 (noting the crisis of overcrowding that followed the
population growth in American prisons).
88. Id.
89. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1580.
90. Morris, supra note 80, at 237.
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prison population,91 many prison systems remain operating at or
near capacity, as discussed above.92
The harms associated with the crowded living conditions of
modern prisons are well-known.93 Crowded conditions lead to
increased violence, and prison studies confirm that prison
overcrowding can lead to detrimental impacts for particularly
vulnerable incarcerated populations (“e.g., those in bad health or
having severe psychiatric disorders, older people”).94 Crowded
prisons also have problems providing adequate medical care to
people behind bars.95 Prison crowding limits the programming
and educational opportunities available to incarcerated people,96
and it reduces the availability of visitation for people confined
behind prison walls.97 The decrease in programming and
education often occurs despite engorged budgets allegedly
responsive to the larger prison population.98
91. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1581, 1620 (cataloguing reform efforts undertaken by
the state and federal governments and the concomitant decrease in prison population and
crime rate). While overall incarceration has begun to decrease, “[i]ncarceration of women
has increased dramatically in recent decades, growing at twice the pace of men’s
incarceration.” Andrea James, Ending the Incarceration of Women and Girls, 128 YALE L.J.
F. 772, 775 (2019). Many of the harms associated with this increase in incarceration fall
disproportionately on Black women and children. Id. at 775-77.
92. Widra, supra note 71.
93. Id.
94. See id.; see also Stéphanie Baggi, et al., Do Overcrowding and Turnover Cause
Violence in Prisons?, FRONTIERS IN PSYCHIATRY (Jan. 24, 2020), [https://perma.cc/NWX44BSX].
95. Widra, supra note 71; see also Amy Miller, Overcrowding in Nebraska’s Prisons
is Causing a Medical and Mental Health Care Crisis, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 16,
2017), [https://perma.cc/T93Z-UGLV] (recounting “inexplicable failures of the most basic
medical care,” including “a man with epilepsy who has landed in the hospital several times
because he didn’t receive seizure medication” and a rape victim who reported her rape upon
entering prison, was given a routine physical exam, but “staff somehow missed the fact she
was pregnant until she unexpectedly went into labor”).
96. Widra, supra note 71; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-743,
BUREAU OF PRISONS: GROWING INMATE CROWDING NEGATIVELY AFFECTS INMATES,
STAFF, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 19-20 (2012) [hereinafter GAO-12-743] (recounting the
decrease in programming and educational opportunities, “resulting in waiting lists and
inmate idleness,” caused by federal prison population growth).
97. GAO-12-743, supra note 96, at 21 (explaining that Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
facilities have “visiting space to accommodate the number of inmates that the facility was
designed to house and a visitor capacity to enable staff to manage the visitation process. The
infrastructure of the facility may not support the increase in visitors as a result of the growth
of the prison population.”).
98. See Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice System,
128 YALE L.J. F. 791, 793 (2019) (explaining that the “federal prison population increased
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Thus, prison officials knew of the harms associated with the
sheer number and close proximity of people living in carceral
facilities well before the pandemic. In fact, public health officials
have known for decades that prisons made for easy “breeding
grounds for all sorts of communicable diseases.”99 Despite this
knowledge, prison systems proved ill-equipped to handle the
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the incarcerated
population. In September 2020, incarcerated people were
experiencing an infection rate four times higher than the general
population and a death rate twice as high.100 The import of these
statistics, particularly on marginalized communities, can be
slightly misleading, however, because they fail to account for
three important facts: first, Black Americans are twice as likely
to die from COVID-19.101 Second, Black Americans are
“incarcerated . . . 5.1 times [more often than] white
Americans.”102 Finally, “incarcerated individuals are much
younger, [and] more likely to be male” than non-incarcerated
individuals.103
In sum, there can be no doubt that American prisons are
“COVID-19 hotspots”104 and that the pandemic has been
devastating to the incarcerated population, particularly Black
incarcerated men.105 Stuck inside overcrowded facilities, these
people had no control over whether and when they might be
exposed to the virus. Their safety remained in the hands of their
captors, prison officials who work within the prison bureaucratic
from 24,640 in 1980 to 185,617 in 2017” and that even though the budget “has grown,
‘crowding out’ other Department of Justice (DOJ) priorities, the federal prison system has
still largely failed to implement evidence-based rehabilitation programs”).
99. Widra, supra note 71; see also James Hamblin, Mass Incarceration is Making
Infectious Diseases Worse, THE ATLANTIC (July 18, 2016), [https://perma.cc/7AL6-DKQ9]
(noting the prevalence of infectious diseases among the incarcerated population—“4 percent
have HIV, 15 percent have hepatitis C, and 3 percent have active tuberculosis”—and pointing
to the carceral system as “a primary reason that these diseases can’t be eliminated globally”).
100. Widra, supra note 71; see also Kevin T. Schnepel, Covid-19 in U.S. State and
Federal Prisons, NAT’L COMM’N ON COVID-19 & CRIM. JUST., 3 (Dec. 2020),
[https://perma.cc/F4UM-QDH2].
101. Schnepel, supra note 100, at 18.
102. See Nicole Puglise, Black Americans Incarcerated Five Times More Than White
People-Report, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 18, 2016), [https://perma.cc/3BAP-A9S5].
103. Schnepel, supra note 100, at 7.
104. Id. at 14.
105. Id. at 18, 20.
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state that developed in response to the exploding prison
population in the latter half of the twentieth century.106 The
impact that prison bureaucracy has on the lives of incarcerated
people is the focus of the next section.
B. The Prison Bureaucracy
As the incarcerated population grew, so too did the need for
people to run the prisons.107 This prison population explosion
also transformed prison systems into modern bureaucracies,
replete with overarching “rules and regulations that bind the
organization[s] together.”108 Many viewed this move toward
bureaucratization of the carceral state as a good thing, and it is
hard to argue that prisons should operate without written rules and
regulations.109 However, the structures of bureaucracy can also
allow individual officials to skirt responsibility when things run
amok, thereby allowing harms to individuals subject to the
bureaucratic state to go unchecked.110
Before turning to these dangers of bureaucracy, however, it
is first important to have a basic understanding of features of
bureaucracies in general and prison bureaucracies in particular.
Malcom M. Feeley and Van Swearingen have succinctly

106. See Malcom M. Feeley & Van Swearingen, The Prison Conditions Cases and the
Bureaucratization of American Corrections: Influences, Impacts and Implications, 24 PACE
L. REV. 433, 456 (2004) (discussing the growth of the number of prisons and guards in the
final three decades of the twentieth century).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 456-57. Civil rights litigation focused on protecting the rights of the
incarcerated also contributed to the creation of the modern, bureaucratic, penal
administrative state. Id. at 455 (explaining that different prison reform efforts “were part of
a process designed to drag pre- and under-bureaucratic (and at times, feudal) criminal justice
institutions into the modern administrative world”). See also Godfrey, supra note 61, at 16465 (discussing the beginning of the modern prisoners’ rights litigation movement).
109. Feely & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 455 (quoting James B. Jacobs, The
Prisoners’ Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960-1980, in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE 458
(Michael Tonry et al. eds., 1980)) (noting that prison systems in the 1960s and 1970s had
“no written rules and regulations” but instead used “daily operating procedures . . . passed
[on] from one generation to the next,” resulting in an “ability of the administration to act as
it pleased,” ensuring “its almost total dominance of the mates”).
110. See Dan Luban, et al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 2348, 2352 (1992) (discussing the reoccurring epistemological excuse of “I didn’t
know” that comes naturally “to those who commit wrongs in a bureaucratic setting”).
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described Max Weber’s summary of the key elements of
bureaucracy:
Compared to other forms of organization . . . modern
bureaucracy is defined by a rationalized set of rules and
regulations that bind the organization together. Every office
is arranged in a clear hierarchy of superordination and
subordination, with employees subject to a rigid and
systematic set of policies designed to maintain control and
discipline when necessary. Offices within the bureaucracy
are characterized by their fixed and definite division of
organizational responsibility, and are staffed by highly
trained officials who are appointed by merit, have set salaries
and pensions, secure careers, and duties that are clearly
separated from their private life.111

Feeley and Swearingen also aptly summarize Victor
Thompson’s application of Weber’s ideas to the American
administrative state and identify several additional characteristics
of the modern American bureaucracy.112
In total, this discussion will focus on five characteristics of
bureaucracies identified by Weber and Thompson and applicable
to the modern American carceral state. First, the American
carceral state has a clearly defined organizational structure with
clear divisions of power and responsibility.113 Every state prison
system and the Federal Bureau of Prisons have a hierarchy of
prison administration.114 At the top of the prison hierarchy is the
director of the prison system, a position usually appointed by the

111. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 456 (citing MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT
GESELLSCHAFT 650-78, 957, 973 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim
Fischoff et al. trans., 1968)).
112. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 456-57 (citing VICTOR A. THOMPSON,
MODERN ORGANIZATION 10-24 (1961)). Four of those additional characteristics are
relevant to this discussion: (1) routinization of organizational activity, (2) classification of
persons, (3) slowness to act or to change, and (4) “preoccupation with the monistic ideal—
the system of superior and subordinate relationships in which the superior is the only source
of legitimate influence upon the subordinate.” Id. at 457. The other American characteristics
of bureaucracy identified by Thompson are factoring the general goal into subgoals,
formalistic impersonality, and categorization of data. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.; see also Morris, supra note 80, at 226.
UND
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governor or, in the case of the federal system, by the President.115
The organizational structure that each system director commands
varies slightly depending on the size and responsibility of each
particular system.116 For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons
is organized into separate divisions focused on subject matter as
well as separate geographical regions meant to provide oversight
and support to the prisons within that region.117 Most state
systems, in contrast, are organized into divisions based on
specific subject matter.118
Below this broad administrative structure sitting atop the
prison system as a whole are the people responsible for running
particular prisons, usually known as wardens.119 Wardens are
responsible for the staff members who actually work in the
prisons: the administrative, custodial, and programming staff.120
The vast majority of prison officials are custodial, or security,
staff, but the division between those responsible for security and
those responsible for programming or administration is largely
farcical.121 Indeed, the most important divisions within the prison
115. Morris, supra note 80, at 226; see also Rotman, supra note 85, at 167 (discussing
the federal prison system’s transition from no central organizing body to a civil service
system).
116. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 457-58.
117. See Organizational Structure, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, [https://perma.cc/565P8PMR] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021).
118. See, e.g., Organization Chart, ALA. DEP’T OF CORRS., [https://perma.cc/9LVT67VB] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021); Attachment L: State Organization Charts, STATE OF
ALASKA-DEP’T OF CORRS., [https://perma.cc/B7K4-JVWZ] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021);
Rehabilitation & Reentry, ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORRS., [https://perma.cc/6FM2-DATL] (last
visited Sept. 16, 2021); Division of Correction Organizational Chart, ARK. DEP’T OF
CORRS., [https://perma.cc/5NUR-DBBQ] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021); Organizational
Chart, COLO. DEP’T OF CORRS. (Feb. 1, 2021), [https://perma.cc/6XEQ-6XJC].
119. Morris, supra note 80, at 226.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 226-27; see also Eric Katz, Federal Prison Employees Fear Staff Shortages
and Mass Reassignments as COVID-19 Cases Spike, GOV’T EXEC. (Dec. 1, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/TK23-M9Y2] (noting the federal prison system’s practice of
augmentation, whereby non-custodial staff are “augment[ed]” to perform duties of security
staff and justifying such practice by pointing to the fact that “all staff are trained as
correctional officers”). Prison officials have an overwhelming us vs. them mentality,
wherein it remains of utmost importance that they remain separate from “the criminal
element they supervise.” See Anthony Gangi, Yes, Corrections Officers Are Law
Enforcement Officers, CORRECTIONS1 (Sept. 1, 2015), [https://perma.cc/FD4J-WLKU]
(explaining that in the correctional officers’ view, the lack of acceptance by the broader law
enforcement community functions as a separation “from their brothers/sisters in blue [that]
brings them closer to the offenders in their charge”).
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itself are those created by the prison’s top-down, hierarchical
structure that is modeled off of paramilitary organizations.122
Accompanying this structure is an understanding that a
subordinate staff person’s only legitimate source of direction
must come from his, her, or their superior.123 This can create
confusion in prison systems, however, when administrative
supervisors—e.g., those responsible for running the medical or
mental health programs—issue orders to security staff related to
an individual’s treatment.124 This type of confusion can also
contribute to the tendency to pass the blame when something goes
wrong for a particular incarcerated individual in a prison facility,
discussed in more detail below.125
The second and third characteristics of bureaucratic systems
that can be seen in the American carceral state are interrelated.
Second, the American carceral state is theoretically bound by a
set of rules and regulations.126 Third, these rules and regulation
are, in theory, used to routinize organizational activity.127 The
reason I use the terms “theoretically” and “in theory” to describe
these two characteristics are important. While it is true that
almost every corrections system in the country has a codified
system of rules meant to govern the operation of the system, many
systems have found ways to “circumvent” the rules and their
processes by implementing specific practices at their facilities
that are unique to the specific security and programming concerns
of a particular facility.128 What this means, practically speaking,
is that while prison systems can often enact rules and regulations
that, on their face, are meant to protect the health and safety of
individuals who are incarcerated, those rules may not always be
122. Marvin Preston, What is “Paramilitary”?, CORRECTIONS.COM (Apr. 26, 2010),
[https://perma.cc/KA68-AA7Z] (describing the established ranking system in most prison
systems as including line staff (corrections officers), supervisors (corporals and sergeants),
and managers (lieutenants, captains, and majors)).
123. See id. (explaining one corrections officer’s experience in the necessity of
following orders); see also Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 457 (stating prisons
utilize a hierarchal structure to assign clear duties to subordinates within the organization).
124. Preston, supra note 122 (noting that “Line Staff” can be confused about the
necessity of following orders from non-security staff).
125. See VENTERS, supra note 4, at 10.
126. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 459.
127. Id. at 464.
128. Id. at 460.
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fully followed at the institutional level. This problem can be
compounded by the fluid nature of who is occupying leadership
positions at any given time. Because the commissioners or
directors of prison systems are appointed positions, whomever is
filing those positions is necessarily influenced by the political
whim of the current executive.129 This means that a reformminded leader may struggle to find buy-in from lower-level staff
when implementing any changes to the system, or, conversely, a
reform-minded lower-level staff may not be able to implement
reforms without buy-in from the current prison administration.130
Fourth, the American carceral state relies upon the
classification of incarcerated individuals.131 The federal prison
system became the first prison system to create a classification
system for incarcerated people.132 Classification systems allow
prisons to assign people “to specific institutions, units, and cells
according to their propensity for violence, length of sentence,
criminal history, and the like.”133 While in some instances
classification may afford more protection to incarcerated
individuals,134 it has also led to the creation of so-called “prison[s]
of last resort,” where so-called intractable people can be sent
when the prison system cannot find another place for them.135
129. Morris, supra note 80, at 227 (describing the problem inherent to the “lack of
continuity in leadership” at the director level).
130. See, e.g., Michelle Theriault Boots, ‘It was Working’: The Rise (and Fall) of an
Alaska Prison Reformer, THE CRIME REP. (Mar. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/6V42-KJFS]
(detailing the experience of a prison superintendent in Alaska who had backing to try an
experimental re-entry unit from one prior commissioner only to have that backing dropped
upon entry of the new commissioner).
131. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 463.
132. Rotman, supra note 85, at 167 (noting that the first director of the Federal Bureau
of Prisons implemented “a number of important improvements,” including developing a
system that “made classification far more systematic in federal [than] in state facilities”).
133. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 464.
134. Id.
135. Rotman, supra note 85, at 167 (describing the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ first
last-resort prison, Alcatraz).
In 1934, Alcatraz was awarded this distinction. Its purpose was to isolate the
criminal of the “vicious and irredeemable type,” those with no hope of
rehabilitation. Prisoners for Alcatraz were selected from other federal prisons
and were transferred back to other prisons before their release. Alcatraz
inmates had virtually no privileges and little contact with the outside world.
To prevent secret messages, officials never allowed prisoners to receive
original copies of their mail, only transcribed ones. In the early years,
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While these so-called supermax prisons were meant to reduce
violence in prison systems,136 recent studies have demonstrated
that these facilities did not reduce misconduct or violence.137 This
means that tens of thousands of individuals have languished in
conditions of solitary confinement with little penological
justification simply as a result of prison systems’ classification
schemes.138 These classification schemes also prevented swaths
of incarcerated people from securing release during the pandemic
because prison systems classified them as high risk.139
Fifth, the American carceral state is slow to reform.140
Whether through litigation or legislation, reforms to carceral
systems are usually incremental, contentious, and remain
ongoing.141 That means that when faced with a new threat like
conversation among inmates was prohibited except when indispensable. To
compensate for these restrictions, Alcatraz had a fairly extensive library with
many classics, and its food was above the average. Although the rest of the
federal system was overcrowded, Alcatraz maintained its original purpose as
a jail for the worst of the worst, a purpose that resulted in a surplus of beds.
During the thirty years Alcatraz was in use, it housed a total of only 1,557
prisoners, with the highest average of daily prisoners occurring in 1937 at 302.
Because of deterioration of the physical plant, Alcatraz was closed in 1963 and
was replaced by the federal penitentiary at Marion, Illinois.
Id. at 167-68. In the early 1990s, the ADX in Florence, Colorado, replaced Marion as the
BOP’s prison of last resort. See Raymond Luc Levasseur, Trouble Coming Every Day:
ADX—The First Year 1996, in THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS: (NEO)SLAVE NARRATIVES AND
CONTEMPORARY PRISON WRITINGS 47, 50 (Joy James, ed., 2005) (describing the
construction of ADX, slated to replace Marion); see also Robertson, supra note 65, at 1023
n.92 (1997) (describing ADX as “a ‘high tech’ concrete dungeon [that] houses inmates in
cells that prevent them from having eye contact with other inmates”).
136. Chad S. Briggs et al., The Effect of Supermaximum Security Prisons on Aggregate
Levels of Institutional Violence, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1341, 1341-42 (2003).
137. Benjamin Steiner & Callie M. Cain, The Relationship Between Inmate
Misconduct, Institutional Violence, and Administrative Segregation: A Systematic Review of
the Evidence, in RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN THE U.S.: ISSUES, CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 165, 179 (2016).
138. Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 130-33 (cataloguing the harms of solitary
confinement); see also Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary
Confinement is Cruel and Far Too Usual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741, 747-49 (2015)
(discussing the overuse of solitary confinement in American prisons).
139. Covid-19 Prisoner Releases Too Few, Too Slow, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May
27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/5RJE-LK9P] (explaining that government release orders
prioritized “low-level offenders,” among others, and excluded many who “could be released
without risk to public safety”).
140. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 457.
141. Id. at 465; see also Michelle Chen, The Growing Fight Against Solitary
Confinement, THE PROGRESSIVE (Jan. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/9ZPK-ABPJ]
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the COVID-19 pandemic, prison systems are slow to find ways to
respond in a way that will save lives.142
Overall, these five characteristics of the bureaucracies of the
American carceral state all too often cause individualized harms
to the people subject to the whims of those bureaucracies—
incarcerated people—that are not readily attributable to any
individual prison officials.143 In other words, the bureaucratic
system itself allows for the “compartmentalization, mutual buckpassing, and deniability” necessary to allow people operating
within bureaucracies to stand idly by as real, concrete, serious
harms befall other human beings.144 These harms can result from
officials’ mechanical adherence to duty, process, or policy
without regard for “what the fulfillment of his or her duty might
entail.”145 In other words, the characteristics of bureaucracy
inherent to American prison systems—the clearly defined
organizational structure with specific divisions of power and
responsibility and specific rules and regulations that govern that
power and responsibility—result in situations where individual
bureaucrats feel bound to follow rigid structures and policies
rather than respond to individualized problems or harms that
present themselves.146 Thus, the harms that befall people who are
incarcerated are not always, or even usually, attributable to rogue
prison officials but rather to the failures of the system itself.

(cataloguing the long fight in several states to curb the use of solitary confinement in the
prison system).
142. Covid-19 Prisoner Releases Too Few, Too Slow, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 27,
2020), [https://perma.cc/5YYE-45WU] (criticizing prison systems worldwide for delaying
releases, thereby “contributing to preventable suffering and death”).
143. See Luban, et al., supra note 110, at 2355 (attributing lack of individual
accountability for organizational harms to the “fragmentation of knowledge and
responsibility” that occurs in bureaucratic organizations).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2354. The paradigmatic example of the horror that can follow rigid
adherence to bureaucratic duty is, of course, Nazism: “perhaps the single most salient
characteristic of the Nazi crimes was their bureaucratic nature. They were committed, not
by a lawless gang of criminals, but by a regularly functioning state bureaucracy executing
official policies.” Id.
146. Cf. id. at 2359 (“The horrors of Nazism are without parallel, but the bureaucratic
pattern of organizations that fragments the knowledge required for moral decisionmaking is
common to large institutions throughout contemporary society.”).
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Take, for example, the death of Mr. Coley in the Cummins
Unit in Arkansas discussed above.147 A series of systemic
failures, not wholly attributable to the actions of individual prison
officials, worked together to cause his death: the failure of the
system to set up protocols to protect incarcerated people from the
virus’s spread, the failure of the system to find ways to treat rather
than isolate people who contracted the virus, and the failure of
any number of line staff to check-on Mr. Coley in his isolation
cell.148 These types of systemic failures are what I call
institutional indifference: the ways in which the prison
bureaucracy allows individual prison officials to claim ignorance
of the plight of individual incarcerated people by hiding behind
bureaucratic norms.149
This institutional indifference is compounded by the prison
system’s prioritization of “control and security over humanity.”150
The precedence of security over all else is evident in any number
of common, modern prison practices, including the prevalence of
supermax prisons,151 the intrusive and frequent nature of body
cavity searches,152 the ban on unions of incarcerated workers,153
and the wide-ranging book, speech, and communications bans
that deprive incarcerated people of participation in political
discourse and the marketplace of ideas.154 Because most prison
147. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
148. See supra notes 13-31, 36-41 and accompanying text.
149. Professor Luban and his co-authors call the ability of individual bureaucratic
officials to claim they did not know about the harms occurring around them the
“epistemological excuse.” Luban et al., supra note 110, at 2352. They “argue (1) that
bureaucracies function (often by design) to permit their functionaries to truthfully plead the
excuse ‘I didn’t know!’; (2) that traditional accounts of moral responsibility typically
recognize this epistemological excuse; and (3) that it is therefore very difficult to find a
workable account of moral responsibility within bureaucratic institutions.” Id.
150. Angel E. Sanchez, In Spite of Prison, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1650, 1673 (2019)
(noting that moderate efforts to reform prisons will always fall short because they do not
address the “structural and cultural transformation[s]” required to support change).
151. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 65, at 1017 n.92.
152. See, e.g., Melvin Gutterman, Prison Objectives and Human Dignity: Reaching a
Mutual Accommodation, 1992 BYU 857, 910 (1992) (doubting the veracity that visual body
cavity searches are only for security and “not also to purposefully demoralize and humiliate
the inmate”).
153. See Godfrey, supra note 68, at 1132-35 (describing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Lab.
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977)).
154. See generally Evan Bianchi & David Shapiro, Locked Up, Shut Up: Why Speech
in Prison Matters, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 3 (2018) (describing the implications of limiting
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policies are developed in secret,155 are justified by vague
references to maintaining a prison’s “social order” when
exposed,156 and are largely free from judicial review,157 “prison
officials inevitably err on the side of too little freedom.”158
In sum, the institution’s prioritization of security over
humanity solidifies the authoritarian nature of the modern
American carceral bureaucracy.159 When prison systems limit
both the speech that may leave a facility and the speech that may
enter a facility, they are both monopolizing the sources of public
information about prisons160 and limiting the sources of
information and knowledge for the people inside.161 The net
effect of these types of restrictions is to create a system of forced
idleness in that prison becomes not only a place that physically
separates incarcerated people from the outside world but also
removes them from broader societal conversations.162 This latter
the speech of incarcerated people in light of the most common rationales that justify free
speech—the marketplace of ideas, democracy legitimation, the checking power of free
speech, and self-fulfillment). The net effect of prison censorship policies “is that in the
aggregate, people who are richer, whiter, and not incarcerated, will enjoy greater access to
the marketplace of ideas than others.” Id. at 20; see also James Tager, Literature Locked
Up: How Prison Book Restriction Policies Constitute the Nation’s Largest Book Ban, PEN
AM. 2, 3-4 (Sept. 2019), [https://perma.cc/D2WL-BW4U].
155. Tager, supra note 154, at 1 (noting the lack of “public visibility into how [prison
censorship] policies are considered, adopted, and implemented”).
156. Id. at 5.
157. See infra Section II.B. (discussing judicial deference to prison officials). The
“central evil” of this lack of judicial review is the unchecked “administrative discretion
granted to the poorly trained personnel who deal directly with prisoners.” Gutterman, supra
note 152, at 900.
158. Tager, supra note 154, at 3 (quoting Jones, 433 U.S. 119 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
159. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32
SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 441, 458 (1999) (noting that prisons, by their very nature, are the
“places where serious abuses of power and violations of rights are likely to occur”).
160. Bianchi & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 22 (“Without prisoners’ speech, public
information about prisons would come primarily from prison officials themselves. Speech
in prisons is especially fragile because limited checks on officials’ behavior increase[s] the
risk of retaliation.”); see also infra Section III.B.
161. See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 150, at 1673 (noting the importance of education
to incarcerated people and the view of prison staff that education interferes with their “job”).
To Sanchez, “college education is to the imprisoned what learning to read and write was to
the enslaved—it is central to the abolition movement.” Id.
162. See Robertson, supra note 65, at 1063 (noting the “paradigm shift” in American
punishment that “changed the target of punishment from the body of the offender to his
personhood”).
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removal signals to incarcerated people that they “are unworthy of
activities imparting social value and self-esteem,”163 and leads to
the last feature of institutional indifference I want to discuss: the
systematic deprivation of identity inherent to the American
carceral state.
C. Stripping Incarcerated People of Identity
By separating people from society in self-contained minisocieties (a.k.a., prisons), the United States has already created a
whole new class of other (a.k.a., the incarcerated). In so doing,
American society has added an identity label onto the people it
locks up, but the more insidious impact of this identity label is
that it is meant to supersede all other identity labels a person may
hold.164 It is also meant to be a stigmatic identity,165 an identity
that makes the dehumanizing features of the prison seem justified
to those responsible for maintaining the system of
incarceration.166 In the early days of the American penitentiary
system, this identity was intricately interrelated with the legal
concept of “civil death—the legal and ritual processes that
produced the figure of the prisoner as the living dead.”167
[C]ivil death reduced the criminal citizen to the condition of
an abject “other,” the negative image of the citizen-subject.
The citizen was free; the prisoner was bound and contained.
The citizen was a transcendent spirit or a reasoning mind; the
prisoner was an offensive body vulnerable to violence and
deprivation. The citizen belonged to the human community;
the prisoner was a monstrous exile, beyond the pale of
humanity, without a claim to legal personhood. Divested of
rights and exiled from the body politic, he was unprotected,
163. Id.
164. James, supra note 91, at 774 (explaining how the “criminal legal system threatens
even one’s identity as a mother”).
165. Robertson, supra note 65, at 1033 (noting that the “coerced and regimented
idleness” of the warehouse prison becomes a “‘stigma symbol,’ a sign that represents the
debased identity of the inmate population”).
166. See, e.g., PATRICK ELLIOT ALEXANDER, FROM SLAVE SHIP TO SUPERMAX:
MASS INCARCERATION, PRISONER ABUSE, AND THE NEW NEO-SLAVE NOVEL 112 (2018)
(describing Mumia Abu-Jamal’s description of the U.S. supermax prototype as
“dehumanization by design”); see also Smith, supra note 5, at 29 (“Dehumanization, then, is
no excess or exception; it is the very premise of the American prison.”).
167. Smith, supra note 5, at 39.
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infinitely vulnerable and pliable. He could be whipped or
gagged, confined to solitude, deprived of food, or subjected
to whatever other torments prison officials deemed
necessary either to his correction or to the orderly
functioning of the institution . . . . Civil death justified a
virtually unlimited exploitation and discretionary violence
against the living entombed.168

And while the notion of civil death of the incarcerated has
largely been abandoned as courts began to recognize that
imprisoned people retained some rights,169 the general attitude
underlying the concept continues to pervade the institutional
culture and practices of many American prison systems.170
Thus, while the theoretical rights of the incarcerated
expanded in the final decades of the twentieth century, the
perception of the incarcerated held by institutional actors remains
largely the same—incarcerated individuals are a mere number
amidst the thousands of numbers subjected to the social control
of the state.171 But what gets lost in the institutional bureaucracy
of the prison is the individual and his, her, or their stories and
voice.172
168. Id. at 39-40.
169. See, e.g., Bianchi & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 3 (“[A]s Justice Thurgood
Marshall wrote: ‘When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does not lose his human
quality; his mind does not become closed to ideas; his intellect does not cease to feed on a
free and open interchange of opinions . . . .’”) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
428 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
170. See, e.g., Laura Rovner, “Everything is at Stake if Norway is Sentenced. In that
Case, We Have Failed”: Solitary Confinement and the “Hard” Cases in the United States
and Norway, 1 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 77, 85 (2017) (noting that the practice of solitary
confinement “violates the sacredness of the human person”); Philip Fornaci et al., Criminal
Justice in the Courts of Law and Public Opinion, 62 HOW. L.J. 125, 139 (2018) (commenting
on how the prison system “necessarily and irrevocably leads to the deprivation of the
humanity of prisoners, guards, and the community”).
171. See Morris, supra note 80, at 227-28 (describing how he created the “diary of
prisoner #12345” detailing “one day and one night in the life of a typical prisoner in a typical
prison adjacent to a typical industrial city”).
172. Cf. Sanchez, supra note 150, at 1654 (discussing the need for scholars to account
for the personal stories, narratives, and perspectives of people impacted by prison in order to
“shed light on the inhumanity that goes on inside of prison, the social problems that lead to
prison, and the humanity of those impacted by prison”); see also Gutterman, supra note 152,
at 906 (“Today, as at the beginning, the most serious social consequence of the prison system
is the disintegration of the human personality of those committed to its confines.”); Colin
Kaepernick, The Demand for Abolition, MEDIUM (Oct. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/HDX86TB9] (“The young men there [on Rikers Island] explained the dehumanizing conditions in
the prison that range from denial of literature to physical assault. They have been
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***
The exploding prison population of the last half-century has
led to the creation of a bureaucratic carceral state that sacrifices
the identities of the individuals incarcerated for purported
institutional security and order.173 By prioritizing institutional
order over individual welfare, the modern prison bureaucracy
operates in a state of institutional indifference to the lives of the
people held captive behind prison walls.174 In times of emergency
or uncertainty, like the COVID-19 pandemic, this indifference
inevitably leads to individual harms that are above and beyond
the anticipated harms attendant to incarceration.175 For people
like Mr. Coley in Arkansas, who could not seem to fight through
the bureaucratic maze of the Arkansas Department of Corrections
to obtain adequate protection and medical care, such institutional
indifference leads to the ultimate harm: loss of life. It is for those
harms that one might think the judiciary should stand at the ready
to halt and correct, but for reasons discussed in the next section,
the legal doctrines protecting the incarcerated ignore those harms
to protect the institutionalized indifference of prison officials.
II. JUDICIAL INDIFFERENCE: JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE AND THE PROHIBITION ON CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS
Despite the lack of care afforded Mr. Coley and others like
him confined to the Cummins Unit in Arkansas, a lawsuit filed by
the Arkansas American Civil Liberties Union, Disability Rights
Arkansas, and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
has been thus far minimally successful.176 In requesting
criminalized and caged, in most cases, for being redlined into economic despair. Forever
emblazoned in my memory are the words of one of the young Black men: ‘You love us
when no one else does.’ The young brother was seeking love. He was seeking care. He was
seeking a space that valued his life.”).
173. See supra Part I.
174. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Minta, supra note 5.
176. Aviv, supra note 7 (noting that the lawsuit argued “that the Arkansas prison
system had displayed deliberate indifference to prisoners’ welfare”). While the United States
District Court for the District of Arkansas denied the plaintiff class’s request for emergency
preliminary relief, the court later denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss, so the case
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preliminary injunctive relief, advocates pointed to the following
facts, among others, to request that “the prison system
immediately take more precautions, including releasing some
people to home confinement”:
Cummins has had the tenth-largest coronavirus outbreak in
the nation—nine hundred and fifty-six people, including
sixty-five staff members, have tested positive—but the
Division of Correction has made only minimal steps to
contain it. The [incarcerated people] aren’t given access to
alcohol-based hand sanitizer, even though the medical
director of infectious diseases for the state’s Department of
Health has advocated for its use. “Maybe science will take
precedence now in current situation,” he wrote, in an e-mail
to the secretary of the department. Men are still sleeping in
open barracks, less than three feet apart.177

In response to the advocates’ request, the Arkansas attorney
general “argued that the risks to prisoners were not ‘so great that
they violate standards of decency,’ nor were they ‘ones that
today’s society does not tolerate.’”178 United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas Judge Kristine Baker agreed,
denying the request for emergency relief and cautioning that
“federal courts should ‘approach intrusion into the core activities
of the state’s prison system with caution.’”179 Such a result is not
surprising when viewed in light of the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence governing the constitutionality of
prison conditions and federal courts’ general policy of deference
to prison officials.
The text of the Eighth Amendment is a mere sixteen words:
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines

remains ongoing. See, e.g., Frazier v. Graves, 4:20-cv-00434-KGB, 2021 WL1236990, at
*18 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 31, 2021) (granting in part and denying in part the state defendants’
motion to dismiss); Frazier v. Graves, 4:20-cv-00434-KGB, 2021 WL4502150, at *15 (E.D.
Ark. Sept. 30, 2021) (granting in part and denying in part private medical provider’s motion
to dismiss).
177. Id. (“A spokesperson for the Department of Corrections told [the reporter] in an
e-mail that if [prisoners] in every other bed follow new instructions to sleep with their feet
in the spot typically occupied by their heads, their faces will be ‘separated by 6 feet from the
next [prisoner’s] pillow.’”).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”180 The
Eighth Amendment doctrine governing claims challenging prison
conditions derives from the last six words of the Amendment: the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.181 While federal courts
declined to entertain constitutional claims challenging prison
conditions for more than a century after the adoption of the Bill
of Rights,182 the Supreme Court articulated and developed the
modern doctrine in a series of cases beginning in 1976 and ending
in 1994.183 Since then, lower courts have struggled to uniformly
apply the doctrine, and scholars have almost unanimously
criticized it as illogical, inconsistent, and unjust.184 As I explain
180. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
181. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (explaining that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause both places restraints and imposes duties on prison officials).
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, drawn nearly verbatim from Article Ten of the
English Bill of Rights, “became part of the American Bill of Rights in 1791.” COLIN DAYAN,
THE STORY OF CRUEL & UNUSUAL 6 (2007). While scholars debate the intention of the
English parliamentarians in drafting Article Ten, most scholars accept that the American
Framers intend for the clause to prohibit certain methods of punishment. See Godfrey, supra
note 61, at 158-59 (discussing scholarly debate around the intent of the drafters in both
England and the United States).
182. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 165 (describing the “hands-off” doctrine that governed
federal courts’ review of prison conditions).
183. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment); Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (leaving undisturbed district court’s finding that conditions in
Arkansas’s prisons violated the Eighth Amendment); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
346-48 (1981) (focusing on objective effects of double-celling to determine that practice did
not violate the Eighth Amendment); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (holding,
in the context of an excessive force case, that “[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not
inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause”); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1991) (confirming
that a two-part test, consisting of objective and subjective components, characterized every
Eighth Amendment claim); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (upholding the rule
that “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment”) (internal quotations omitted); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993)
(confirming that Eighth Amendment protects against future harm); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 84041, 847 (defining deliberate indifference as those instances where a prison official knows of
a risk of harm attendant to a prison condition but fails to take reasonable steps to abate the
risk).
184. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 186 (criticizing the application of the current doctrine
in cases seeking injunctive relief); Margo Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of
Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 357, 428-29 (2018) (criticizing the
Eighth Amendment doctrine’s focus on the subjective intent of prison officials rather than
the objective harms inflicted on the incarcerated); Erin E. Braatz, The Eighth Amendment
Milieu: Penal Reform in the Late Eighteenth Century, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 405,
426 (2016) (criticizing Eighth Amendment doctrine for failing to fully account for the
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below, part of the challenge with the standard is that it developed
out of a judicial refusal to acknowledge that, in prison conditions
cases, the punishment at issue is incarceration itself.
A. Ignoring Incarceration as Punishment
The Supreme Court first considered how the Eighth
Amendment might apply to prison conditions claims in the 1976
case of Estelle v. Gamble.185 Estelle, viewed by many as an
improvident grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court,186
established that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ . . .
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”187 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court identified four types of punishments
“repugnant to the Eighth Amendment”: (1) those “incompatible
with ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society;’”188 (2) those “which ‘involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain;’”189 (3) those which
are “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime;”190 and
contextual history of punishments utilized in early America); Brittany Glidden, Necessary
Suffering?: Weighing the Government and Prisoner Interests in Determining What is Cruel
and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815, 1820-21 (2012) (criticizing the unpredictability
of application of current Eighth Amendment doctrine); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison
Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 890 (2009) (criticizing
Eighth Amendment doctrine’s undue focus on what constitutes punishment rather than what
is cruel). John F. Stinneford, in a series of articles, has also criticized current Eighth
Amendment doctrine for being untethered to the original meaning of the words comprising
the clause. See John F. Stinneford, Experimental Punishments, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 39,
48-55 (2019) [hereinafter Stinneford, Experimental Punishments]; John F. Stinneford, The
Original Meaning of “Cruel”, 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 502 (2017) [hereinafter Stinneford,
Original Meaning of Cruel]; John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The
Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1753-54 (2008)
[hereinafter Stinneford, Original Meaning of Unusual].
185. 429 U.S. 97, 102-04.
186. See, e.g., id. at 115 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing puzzlement at the Court’s
decision to grant certiorari); Schlanger, supra note 183, at 369 (noting that Estelle “was quite
a low-profile case—no amicus briefs were filed, and the New York Times described the
majority opinion as ‘generally stat[ing] the law as it has been developing in the lower Federal
courts’”) (quoting Lesley Oelsner, Prison Medical Care Assayed by Justices, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 1, 1976), [https://perma.cc/3HSR-5BJ4]).
187. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
188. Id. at 102 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
189. Id. at 103 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
190. Id. at 103 n.7 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173).
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(4) those which transgress the “substantive limits on what can be
made criminal and punished.”191 The Court determined that
Estelle did not involve the last two types of punishment and
therefore focused its inquiry on the first two.192 Turning to the
first two types of punishment, the Court determined that when the
government is punishing someone by incarceration, it must
provide medical care to that person because failing to do so will
result in, at worst, “physical ‘torture or a lingering death’” or, at
best, “pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any
penological purpose.”193
Importantly, the Court appeared to recognize that the
“punishment” at issue in Estelle was incarceration itself, and the
question posed to the Court was whether the pro se prisoner’s
allegations of inadequate medical care were cruel and unusual
such that the punishment became unconstitutional.194 However,
this recognition becomes muddled by the Court’s decision to
reassure prison officials that not “every claim by a prisoner that
he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation
of the Eighth Amendment.”195 To make this reassurance, the
Court analogized the inadvertent failure to provide adequate
medical care to the circumstances at issue in Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber.196 In Resweber, Louisiana had sentenced
Willie Francis, a Black man, to death, but a mechanical
malfunction “thwarted” the State’s first attempt to electrocute
him.197 Mr. Francis “petitioned the Supreme Court, arguing that
a second attempt to execute him would be unconstitutionally
cruel,”198 and the Court denied Mr. Francis’s petition, reasoning
that because the failure of the first attempt was an “unforeseeable
accident,”199 trying again did not amount to cruel and unusual
191. Id. (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)).
192. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 n.7.
193. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (first quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890);
and then citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182-83).
194. Id. at 103, 106.
195. Id. at 105.
196. Id. at 105-06 (citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464,
470 (1947)).
197. DAYAN, supra note 181, at 27; see also Estelle, 428 U.S. at 105.
198. DAYAN, supra note 181, at 27.
199. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464.
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punishment even though “it [might] produce added anguish.”200
Similarly, according to the Court, an act of mere negligence with
regard to medical care could not be cruel and unusual under the
Constitution.201
Presciently, Justice Stevens, in dissent, predicted that the
Estelle majority’s focus on “the accidental character of the first
unsuccessful attempt to electrocute the prisoner in” Resweber,
and “its repeated references to ‘deliberate indifference’ and the
‘intentional’ denial of adequate medical care” would attach
unwarranted significance to the “subjective motivation of the
defendant as a criterion for determining whether cruel and
unusual punishment has been inflicted.”202 While Justice Stevens
hinted that the remedies available against a particular defendant
might depend on his subjective intent, he insisted that the question
of “whether the constitutional standard has been violated should
turn on the character of the punishment rather than the motivation
of the individual who inflicted it.”203 Referencing a prisoner-ofwar camp from the civil war, Justice Stevens pointed out:
“[w]hether the conditions in Andersonville were the product of
design, negligence, or mere poverty, they were cruel and
inhuman.”204
Two years after Estelle, in 1978, the Supreme Court again
considered a case involving an Eighth Amendment challenge to
prison conditions.205 Hutto v. Finney arose from a series of cases
challenging the conditions of the Arkansas prison system—
including the Cummins Unit discussed above206—during the
1960s.207 By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the
200. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
201. Id. at 106.
202. Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 116-17.
205. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).
206. See supra notes 5-46 and accompanying text.
207. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 680 n.2 (noting that the case at issue in Hutto began as Holt v.
Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Ark. 1969) [hereinafter Holt I], a sequel to Talley v. Stephens,
247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965) and Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark.
1967), vacated 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968)). Judge Jesse Smith Henley, the Chief Judge of
Eastern District of Arkansas when the cases began in 1965, handled all these cases, even by
special designation after his appointment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in 1975. Id.
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
had issued a series of remedial orders meant to correct the
unconstitutional conditions it characterized as creating “a dark
and evil world completely alien to the free world.”208 While the
Supreme Court’s inquiry focused on the propriety of two aspects
of the relief ordered by the district court,209 the district court’s
orders rested on a finding that the conditions in Arkansas’s
prisons violated the Eighth Amendment.210 In reaching its
decision on the remedial issues before it, the Supreme Court
reiterated that “[c]onfinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is
a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth
Amendment standards.”211 Again, then, the Court implicitly
acknowledged that the punishment examined by the district court
was incarceration, and the district court found that the conditions
of that incarceration rendered the punishment of imprisonment
cruel and unusual.212
Because Hutto presented an issue related only to remedy, the
Supreme Court did not directly consider the question of when
prison conditions render the punishment of incarceration
unconstitutional until the 1981 case of Rhodes v. Chapman.213
208. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 681 (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark.
1970) [hereinafter Holt II]).
209. Id. at 680-81.
210. Id. at 681-83.
211. Id. at 685.
212. Id.; see also Holt II, 309 F. Supp. at 372-73. Indeed, the district court’s conception
of the Eighth Amendment supports this conclusion:
It appears to the Court, however, that the concept of “cruel and unusual
punishment” is not limited to instances in which a particular [person] is
subjected to a punishment directed at him as an individual. In the Court’s
estimation confinement itself within a given institution may amount to a cruel
and unusual punishment prohibited by the Constitution where the confinement
is characterized by conditions and practices so bad as to be shocking to the
conscience of reasonably civilized people even though a particular [person]
may never personally be subject to any disciplinary action. To put it another
way, while confinement, even at hard labor and without compensation, is not
considered to be necessarily a cruel and unusual punishment it may be so in
certain circumstances and by reason of the conditions of the confinement.
Holt II, 309 F. Supp. 372-73. Thus, the question considered by the district court involved
not whether the challenged conditions amounted to punishment but rather whether the
conditions could be understood as cruel and unusual such that the punishment of
incarceration became unconstitutional.
213. 452 U.S. 337, 344-45 (1981) (noting the case presented the first time the Court
would consider “the limitation that the Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States
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Relying on Hutto, the Court reiterated that incarceration “is a
form of punishment subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment standards,”214 and it defined the dispute at issue as a
question of whether “the conditions of confinement at a particular
prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment.”215 Drawing on
Eighth Amendment standards articulated in other contexts, the
Court reiterated that federal courts must rely on “objective
indicia” when determining whether a particular punishment is
cruel and unusual.216 Underscoring the “flexible and dynamic”217
nature of the Eighth Amendment inquiry, the Court maintained
that no “static ‘test’” could be applied to “determine whether
conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual.”218 Reiterating
the four types of punishment identified in Estelle as violative of
the Eighth Amendment,219 the Court held that “[c]onditions [that]
. . . deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure[s] of life’s
necessities” violate the Eighth Amendment.220
Applying this new rule to the case before it, the Court
examined whether the system of double-celling utilized by the
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility created cruel and unusual
conditions of confinement.221 To make this determination, the
Court examined whether the “double celling made necessary by
the unanticipated increase in prison population” led to
“deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” (i.e.,
the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities).222 The Court
concluded that the findings of fact articulated by the district court
amounted to no such deprivations.223 The Court then went on,
however, to recognize that the practice of double celling did
through the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . imposes upon the conditions in which a State may
confine those convicted of crimes”) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
214. Id. at 345 (emphasis added) (quoting Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 346-47 (first citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-87 (1976); and then
citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
217. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171).
218. Id. at 346 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
219. Id. at 346 n.12; see also supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
220. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
221. Id. at 339-40, 347-48.
222. Id. at 348. The Court also included safety among its list of life’s necessities. Id.
at 364 (noting the lack of increased violence).
223. Id. at 348.
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deprive incarcerated people of job and educational
opportunities.224 The Court concluded that such deprivations,
however, did “not inflict pain, much less unnecessary and wanton
pain.”225 Seemingly, then, the deprivations could not be deemed
cruel and unusual. Rather than draw this conclusion, though, the
Court instead concluded that “deprivations of this kind simply are
not punishments.”226 This conclusion muddled the issue
presented to the Court, which focused on whether the conditions
at issue were cruel and unusual,227 not whether the conditions
amounted to a punishment above and beyond the punishment of
incarceration itself. This type of confusion—as to whether the
issue presented in cases challenging prison conditions involves a
question of what is cruel and unusual versus what is
punishment—continued to shape Eighth Amendment doctrine
over the course of the next decade and muddles the current
doctrine’s application today.228
224. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348.
225. Id.
226. Id. (emphasis added).
227. Id. at 345.
228. See generally id. Importantly, the concurring and dissenting opinions in Rhodes
cautioned that the majority opinion may be read “as a retreat from careful judicial scrutiny
of prison conditions.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 353, (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, reiterated the importance of judicial intervention
to correct unlawful prison conditions in order to ensure “constitutional dictates—not to
mention considerations of basic humanity—are to be observed in the prisons.” Id. at 354.
Acknowledging the pressing problems posed by “[o]vercrowding and cramped living
conditions,” id. at 356, and the “[p]ublic apathy [toward] and [] political powerlessness of
inmates,” id. at 358, Justice Brennan noted the important role judicial intervention plays in
remedying, albeit slowly, unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Id. at 359. Justice
Brennan also recognized the federal courts’ role “[i]n determining when prison conditions
pass beyond legitimate punishment and become cruel and unusual.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
364 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). To fulfill that role, Justice Brennan
suggested that the focus of the Court’s inquiry should be on the conditions’ “effect upon the
imprisoned.” Id. (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 323 (D.N.H. 1977)). To
Justice Brennan, “[w]hen the ‘cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration threatens
the physical, mental, and emotional health and well-being of the inmates and/or creates a
probability of recidivism and future incarceration,’” the conditions at issue violate the
Constitution. Id. (quoting Laaman, 437 F. Supp. at 323). Finding that the evidence
considered by the district court failed to demonstrate serious harm to the prisoners confined
to the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, Justice Brennan ultimately concurred in the
judgment of the Court. Id. at 368. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurrence to caution
against the adoption of “a policy of general deference” to prison administrators. Id. at 369
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Finally, Justice Marshall, in dissent, cautioned that the majority
decision may “eviscerate the federal courts’ traditional role of preventing a State from
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The next Supreme Court decision to consider the Eighth
Amendment’s application in the prison setting further
compounded the confusion inherent in the majority’s decision in
Rhodes. In the 1986 Whitley v. Albers case, the Court considered
what standard governs a prisoner’s claim that a prison official
subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment through the use of
excessive force.229 While the Whitley Court acknowledged that
prior Eighth Amendment precedent refused to require “[a]n
express intent to inflict unnecessary pain” to find a constitutional
violation,230 the Court ultimately deviated from this maxim when
it articulated the excessive force standard.231 Citing Ingraham v.
Wright232 for the proposition that “[n]ot every governmental
action affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject
to Eighth Amendment scrutiny,”233 the Court once again
conflated the inquiry into what the punishment being challenged
is with the inquiry into whether that punishment is cruel and

imposing cruel and unusual punishment through its conditions of confinement.” Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 375 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Finding that the district court and court of appeals
had faithfully discharged their roles in redressing deplorable conditions, Justice Marshall
would have left the injunction entered by the district court requiring single-celling
undisturbed. Id. at 377.
229. 475 U.S. 312, 314 (1986). Justice O’Connor, who wrote the five to four majority
opinion, framed the question presented to the Court a little differently: “[t]his case requires
us to decide what standard governs a prison inmate’s claim that prison officials subjected
him to cruel and unusual punishment by shooting him during the course of their attempt to
quell a prison riot.” Id. at 314. The dissent, written by Justice Marshall and joined by Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, took issue with this framing, and accused the majority of
conflating questions of fact that “are likely to be hotly contested” with the choice of a legal
standard. Id. at 329 (Marshall, J., dissenting). “It is inappropriate, to say the least, to
condition the choice of a legal standard, the purpose of which is to determine whether to send
a constitutional claim to the jury, upon the court’s resolution of factual disputes that in many
cases should themselves be resolved by the jury.” Id. Despite the dissent’s narrow view of
the question decided by the Whitley majority, lower federal courts have since uniformly
applied Whitley’s “malicious[] and sadistic[]” standard to cases involving the use of
excessive force by prison officials. See, e.g., Kapfhammer v. Boyd, 5 F. Supp. 2d 689, 69293 (E.D. Wis. 1998); Estrada v. Smart, 514 F. Supp. 3d 1270, 1275-76 (D. Colo. 2021);
Gwathney v. Warren, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1314 (M.D. Ala. 2013).
230. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
231. Id. at 319, 327.
232. 430 U.S. 651, 653-54, 683 (1977) (involving a challenge to the use of corporal
punishment at a junior high school in which the Court concluded that such a challenge could
not fall under the purview of the Eighth Amendment); see generally Raff Donelson, Who
Are the Punishers?, 86 UMKC L. REV. 259 (2017).
233. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
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unusual.234 In Whitley, the Court articulated that the Eighth
Amendment standard in cases challenging the use of force
involves the question of “whether [the] force was applied in a
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”235 The
Court identified several factors relevant to the malicious and
sadistic inquiry, including the need for the application of force,
the relationship between the need for force and the amount of
force used, the extent of the injury, the threat to the safety of staff
and prisoners, and any efforts made to temper the severity of the
response.236
In contrast to the majority opinion, the dissent in Whitley
would have maintained a focus on objective indicia to determine
whether a particular punishment (i.e., incarceration) has been
rendered cruel and unusual by internal prison conditions.237 To
the dissenting justices, the correct Eighth Amendment standard to
apply in a case of excessive force would have been “the
‘unnecessary and wanton’ standard,”238 the application of which
would require consideration of the “circumstances of the
plaintiff’s injury, including whether it was inflicted during an
attempt to quell a riot and whether there was a reasonable
234. This may not be the exact same analytical problem identified in this Article’s
discussion of Rhodes (and subsequent conditions cases). See supra Section II.A. In general,
the problem with the Eighth Amendment doctrine is that it has developed an unnecessary
focus on intent because it has been focused (erroneously) on whether the conditions being
challenged are punishment rather than whether the incarceration (i.e., the punishment) is
cruel and unusual because of certain conditions. See id. But it may be in cases of excessive
force that the punishment inquiry is not wrong because the force is not necessarily attendant
to the punishment (incarceration), whereas with conditions challenges, the conditions are
attendant to the incarceration. So, in excessive force cases, there may be a necessary inquiry
into the intent of the force, and there is a need to draw on how the Court defines punishment
in cases like Ingraham and Bell v. Wolfish. See generally Ingraham, 430 U.S. 651; Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). This could also require an inquiry into whether the doctrine
should be different when the challenge involves “conduct” of a prison official rather than
mere “conditions” within a prison. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 ( stating that “[t]o be cruel
and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve
more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety”). This inquiry,
however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
235. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21, (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d
Cir. 1973)).
236. Id. at 321.
237. Id. at 329, 334 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 329.
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apprehension of danger[.]”239 While the dissent did not fully
articulate how the “‘unnecessary and wanton’ standard” would
apply beyond the facts at issue in Whitley, it is clear that the focus
of the inquiry for those justices would be the totality of the
objective circumstances and not the subjective intent of prison
official defendants.240
The 1991 decision in Wilson v. Seiter brought to a head the
question of whether an Eighth Amendment challenge to prison
conditions required a subjective showing as to the intent of prison
officials.241 The case involved a challenge lodged by Pearly L.
Wilson, a man incarcerated by the State of Ohio at the Hocking
Correctional Facility (HCF) in Nelsonville, Ohio.242 Mr. Wilson
challenged HCF’s “overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient
locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper
ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining
facilities and food preparation, and housing with mentally and
physically ill [prisoners].”243 The question presented involved
whether Mr. Wilson had to demonstrate “a culpable state of mind
on the part of prison officials, and, if so, what state of mind [wa]s
required” in order to prove his Eighth Amendment claims.244
In a five to four decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court
held that Estelle, Rhodes, and Whitley “mandate inquiry into a
prison official’s state of mind when it is claimed that the official
has inflicted cruel and unusual punishment.”245 To support its
conclusion, the majority highlighted that the Eighth Amendment
“bans only cruel and unusual punishment. If the pain inflicted is
not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the
sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See id. at 329.
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 329.
See 501 U.S. 294, 296, 300 (1991).
Id. at 296.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 298-99.
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inflicting officer before it can qualify.”246, 247 To the majority,
then, the conditions attendant to incarceration could only be
challenged under the Eighth Amendment if they amounted to
punishment above and beyond the punishment of incarceration
itself.248
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, concurred only in the judgment249 and criticized the
majority’s understanding of the punishment at issue in prison
conditions cases.250 Justice White first pointed to the Hutto
Court’s acknowledgment “that the conditions of confinement are
part of the punishment that is subject to Eighth Amendment
scrutiny.”251 The concurrence then drew on the Court’s analysis
in Rhodes to conclude that
Rhodes makes it crystal clear, therefore, that Eighth
Amendment challenges to conditions of confinement are to
be treated like Eighth Amendment challenges to punishment
that is “formally meted out as punishment by the statute or
the sentencing judge,” . . . we examine only the objective
severity, not the subjective intent of government officials.252
246. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300. The Court made this point as support for its disregard
of an argument put forth by Mr. Wilson and the United States as amicus curiae that suggested
conditions claims could be distinguished into two categories: (1) “‘short-term’ or ‘one-time’
conditions (in which a state-of-mind requirement would apply)” and (2) “‘continuing’ or
‘systemic’ conditions (where official state of mind would be irrelevant).” Id. The Court saw
no logical or practical use in such a distinction but recognized that “[t]he long duration of a
cruel prison condition may make it easier to establish knowledge and hence some form of
intent.” Id.
247. The Wilson Court also clarified that prisoners could not lodge challenges to
something “so amorphous as ‘overall conditions’” unless those conditions create a “specific
deprivation of a single human need.” Id. at 305. Thus:
[s]ome conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment
violation “in combination” when each would not do so alone, but only when
they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single,
identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a
low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets.
Id. at 304.
248. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-99.
249. The majority vacated the decision of the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case for
reconsideration. Id. at 306. The Sixth Circuit had previously affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to prison officials, concluding that Mr. Wilson had to meet
Whitley’s obduracy and wantonness requirement. Id. at 296.
250. Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
251. Id. at 307.
252. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 309 (White, J., concurring).
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In addition to criticizing the departure from precedent
inherent in the majority’s adoption of an intent requirement, the
concurrence predicted (rightly) that intent may be impossible to
prove in many prison conditions cases,253 in part because of the
institutional indifference outlined in Part I.254
Inhumane prison conditions often are the result of
cumulative actions and inactions by numerous officials
inside and outside a prison, sometimes over a long period of
time. In those circumstances, it is far from clear whose intent
should be examined, and the majority offers no real guidance
on this issue. In truth, intent simply is not very meaningful
when considering a challenge to an institution, such as a
prison system . . . . [H]aving chosen [] imprisonment as a
form of punishment, a State must ensure that the conditions
in its prisons comport with the “contemporary standards of
decency” required by the Eighth Amendment.255

Citing to the United States’ brief as amicus curiae, Justice
White cautioned that inhumane prison conditions would be
insulated from judicial review because of the majority’s
requirement that the prisoner-plaintiffs engage in “an unnecessary
and meaningless search for ‘deliberate indifference.’”256
Notably, neither the majority nor concurrence defined what is
meant by deliberate indifference, instead leaving that question for
another day.257
In the term following Wilson, the Supreme Court heard
another Eighth Amendment case; this one focused on the inquiry

253. Id. at 310.
254. See generally supra Part I.
255. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 310-11 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago City Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-200 (1989)).
256. Id. at 311. The United States, as amicus curiae, argued that “[s]eriously
inhumane, pervasive conditions should not be insulated from constitutional challenge
because the officials managing the institution have exhibited a conscientious concern for
ameliorating its problems, and have made efforts (albeit unsuccessful) to that end.” Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 311 (1991)
(No. 89-7376). A relic of another era, the United States’ position in Wilson stands in stark
contrast to the position taken by the Solicitor General in the COVID-19 cases. See
Application for a Stay of the Injunction Issued by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio and for an Administrative Stay at 32, William v. Wilson, 455 F.
Supp. 3d 467 (N.D. Ohio 2020), vacated 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020).
257. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 294, 297, 302, 303, 305, 306, 311.
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relevant to a claim of excessive force.258 In Hudson v. McMillian,
Keith Hudson alleged that three officers at the Louisiana State
Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana, used excessive force on him
during the early morning hours of October 30, 1983.259 Mr.
Hudson claimed that one officer punched him in the mouth, eyes,
chest, and stomach while the second officer held him in place and
the third officer, a supervisor, looked on, telling the first two
officers “not to have too much fun.”260 As a result of the beating,
Mr. Hudson “suffered minor bruises and swelling of his face,
mouth, and lip,” and he had loosened teeth and a cracked dental
plate.261 The district court found the three officers violated Mr.
Hudson’s rights and awarded him $800 in damages.262 The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that Mr. Hudson “could not prevail on
his Eighth Amendment claim because his injuries were ‘minor’
and required no medical attention.”263 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed.264
The Hudson Court announced three important rules in
support of reversal. First, the Court made clear that the standard
articulated in Whitley—”whether force was applied in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm”—applies in all prison excessive forces
cases.265
Second, the Court determined that because
contemporary standards of decency are violated whenever “prison
officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,” a
prisoner can bring an excessive force claim, whether or not he
suffered significant injury.266 Third, the Eighth Amendment does
not protect de minimis uses of physical force, so long as the “force
is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’”267
Notably, in announcing these rules, the Court declined to
consider the prison officials’ argument that “their conduct [could]
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5.
Id. at 5, 12.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)).
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not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation because it was
‘isolated and unauthorized.’”268 In other words, the Court refused
to consider whether rogue acts of prison officials fall outside the
purview of the Eighth Amendment because such acts cannot fall
within “the scope of ‘punishment’ prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment.”269 This refusal is inconsistent with the Court’s
singular focus on what constitutes punishment in Wilson.270
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, penned a dissent in
Hudson focused on the majority’s “expansion of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause beyond all bounds of history and
precedent.”271 Once again harkening back to the perceived
distinction between punishment meted out by statute or judge
versus punishment attendant to incarceration, Justice Thomas
reminded us that the Eighth Amendment traditionally did not
apply “generally to any hardship that might befall a prisoner
during incarceration.”272
Therefore, because the Eighth
Amendment only applies to “that narrow class of deprivations
involving ‘serious’ injury inflicted by prison officials acting with
a culpable state of mind,” Justice Thomas would hold that a use
of force that causes only insignificant harm does not amount to
cruel and unusual punishment.273 In Justice Thomas’s view, then,
“our society . . . has no expectation that prisoners will have
‘unqualified’ freedom from force, since forcibly keeping
prisoners in detention is what prisons are all about.”274 Therefore,
the Hudson dissent points to the inconsistency in Eighth
Amendment doctrine that requires a showing of seriousness of
harm in medical care cases but not in excessive force cases.275
In the Court’s next term, it heard the Helling v. McKinney
case, which involved a Nevada prisoner’s claim that prison
officials subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by
housing him with another prisoner who smoked.276 Mr.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 11-12.
Id.
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991).
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 18, 20.
Id. at 26.
Id.
509 U.S. 25, 28 (1993).

1 GODFREY.MAN.FIN COPY 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/13/21 2:43 PM

408

Vol. 74:3

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

McKinney, the Nevada prisoner, reached trial on two issues: “(1)
whether [he] had a constitutional right to be housed in a smokefree environment, and (2) whether [the prison officials] were
deliberately indifferent to [his] serious medical needs.”277 At
trial, the district court granted the prison officials’ motion for a
directed verdict, concluding that Mr. McKinney had no
constitutional right to be housed in a smoke free environment and
that he had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate
“medical problems that were traceable to cigarette smoke or
deliberate indifference to them.”278 The Ninth Circuit reversed
the decision of the district court, holding that the court “erred by
directing a verdict without permitting [Mr. McKinney] to prove
that his exposure to [cigarette smoke] was sufficient to constitute
an unreasonable danger to his future health.”279 The prison
officials sought Supreme Court review of this decision, but, in the
interim, the Court decided Wilson and, therefore, remanded the
case to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Wilson.280
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Wilson added a subjective
element to Mr. McKinney’s claim, but it did not otherwise change
its prior decision, which concerned the objective component of
the Eighth Amendment claim (i.e., whether a prisoner-plaintiff
might be able to meet the objective component of the claim by
demonstrating an unreasonable risk to his future health).281 The
prison officials again sought review from the Supreme Court.282
The Court granted certiorari and affirmed in an opinion by
Justice White (who wrote the dissent in Wilson), holding that the
Eighth Amendment protects incarcerated people from future
harm.283 In reaching this holding, the Court reiterated that “the
treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under
which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment.”284 Implicitly, then, the Court harkened back to the
pre-Wilson days when it viewed conditions claims as challenging
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id.
Id. at 28-9.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 29-30.
Helling, 509 U.S. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 31.
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not the punishment of incarceration itself but whether the
conditions at issue rendered such punishment unconstitutional.285
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented once
again.286 This time Justice Thomas strongly intimated that he
would overturn Estelle if presented the opportunity, and he
reiterated and expanded upon his belief that prison conditions are
not and cannot be punishment protected by the Eighth
Amendment.287 He criticized the Court’s prior decisions,
beginning with Estelle, for never examining whether the Eighth
Amendment’s text and purpose supported the conclusion that the
amendment’s protections should protect against prison
deprivations.288 To Justice Thomas, “the text and history of the
Eighth Amendment, together with the decisions interpreting it,
support the view that judges or juries—but not jailers—impose
‘punishment.’”289 Therefore, the entirety of the Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence with regard to prison conditions
claims should be overturned.290
The final case that forms the Supreme Court’s doctrine
around Eighth Amendment claims challenging prison conditions
is Farmer v. Brennan.291 Farmer reached the Court in 1994 and
involved a challenge to prison conditions brought by Dee Farmer,
a transgender woman living in men’s prisons operated by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP).292 Ms. Farmer sued the BOP
and several individual prison officials after being brutally raped
and assaulted in the spring of 1989.293 In her complaint, Ms.
Farmer alleged that the prison official defendants transferred her
to a high security penitentiary “or placed [her] in its general
population despite knowledge that the penitentiary had a violent
environment and a history of inmate assaults, and despite
knowledge that petitioner, as a [transgender woman] who
‘projects feminine characteristics,’ would be particularly
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See supra text accompanying notes 224-25.
Helling, 509 U.S. at 37-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 40, 42.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 40-42.
511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).
Id. at 829.
Id. at 830.
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vulnerable to sexual attack by” other people incarcerated in the
penitentiary.294 Ms. Farmer claimed that these allegations
demonstrated deliberate indifference to her safety and therefore
stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment.295
After the district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants, finding that Ms. Farmer needed to show they had
“actual knowledge” of a potential danger, and the Seventh Circuit
summarily affirmed without opinion, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to finally define the test for deliberate indifference.296
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, first reiterated that Eighth
Amendment prison conditions cases require a showing that a
prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which
means “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.”297
The Court then went on to define the “proper test for deliberate
indifference.”298
After first describing how the Court used the term deliberate
indifference in the cases described above,299 the majority opinion
concluded that the term must mean “something more than mere
negligence” and “something less than acts or omissions for the
very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will
result.”300 Settling on the conclusion that deliberate indifference
must mean something akin to recklessness, the Court ultimately
determined that prison officials can only be held liable for
disregarding conditions or risks of which they are subjectively
aware.301 In reaching this conclusion, the Court again focused on
the idea that the Eighth Amendment only “outlaws cruel and
unusual ‘punishments.’”302
294. Id. at 830-31.
295. Id. at 831.
296. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 831-32.
297. Id. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 302-03).
298. Id. at 835.
299. Id. at 835-36.
300. Id at 835.
301. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841-42.
302. Id. at 837 (“The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual
‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’”).
An act or omission unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm
might well be something society wishes to discourage, and if harm does result
society might well wish to assure compensation. The common law reflects
such concerns when it imposes tort liability on a purely objective basis. But
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Justice Blackmun, concurring, recognized the Court’s undue
focus on the word punishment and reiterated that, in his view,
“inhumane prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment even
if no prison official has an improper, subjective state of mind.”303
Concerned with the pervasive violence in American prisons,
Justice Blackmun highlighted his concern that, for many
incarcerated people, the punishment of incarceration
“degenerates into a reign of terror unmitigated by the protection
supposedly afforded by prison officials.”304 He then went on to
criticize Wilson’s conclusion that “only pain that is intended by a
state actor to be punishment is punishment.”305 Rather than
recognize that incarceration is the punishment in prison
conditions cases, Justice Blackmun instead focused his criticism
on the idea that someone cannot experience punishment unless a
state actor intends for it to be so.306 He also took issue with the
Wilson Court’s “myopic focus on the intentions of prison
officials,” which he saw as plainly ignoring the type of
institutional indifference that can arise from the modern
American system of punishment.307 Justice Stevens wrote a short,
paragraph-long, separate concurrence reiterating his belief that
cruel and unusual punishment does not require a specific
subjective motivation from a prison official.308
an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived
but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be
condemned as the infliction of punishment.
Id. at 837-38 (citations omitted).
303. Id. at 851 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun went on to criticize the
Court’s holding in Wilson, “to the effect that barbaric prison conditions may be beyond the
reach of the Eighth Amendment if no prison official can be deemed individually culpable, in
my view is insupportable in principle and is inconsistent with the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause.” Id.
304. Farmer 511 U.S. at 853 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
305. Id. at 854.
306. Id. at 854-55 (citation omitted) (finding the Wilson Court’s analysis
“fundamentally misguided,” explaining that “‘[p]unishment’ does not necessarily imply a
culpable state of mind on the part of an identifiable punisher. A prisoner may experience
punishment when he suffers ‘severe, rough, or disastrous treatment,’ regardless of whether
a state actor intended the cruel treatment to chastise or deter.”).
307. Id. at 855-56 (pointing to Ninth Circuit Judge Noonan’s observations on the
Framers’ concern “with the cruelty that came from bureaucratic indifference to the
conditions of confinement”) (quoting Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1544 (9th Cir.
1993)); see also supra notes 143-489and accompanying text.
308. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 858 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Finally, Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurrence,
agreeing only in the judgment of the Farmer majority.309
Reiterating his view that only judges and juries inflict
punishment, Justice Thomas once again asserted that
“[c]onditions of confinement are not punishment in any
recognized sense of the term.”310 To him, then, Farmer presented
an easy case: “[b]ecause the unfortunate attack that befell
petitioner was not part of [her] sentence, it did not constitute
‘punishment’ under the Eighth Amendment.”311
As in Wilson, the Farmer Court’s focus once again ignores
that the punishment at issue in prison conditions cases is
incarceration itself, and the only question truly being presented
is whether or not the conditions at issue in any given case have
evolved such that they can now be deemed cruel and unusual.312
However, the Court’s continued failure to recognize that
incarceration is the punishment prisoner-plaintiffs are concerned
with in conditions cases is no surprise when viewed in light of the
overwhelming deference it and the broader federal judiciary have
afforded prison officials for the past half-century.
B. Deference to Prison Officials
While not explicitly part of the Eighth Amendment prison
conditions test, judicial deference to prison officials permeates
federal court decisions applying the doctrine.313 This is no doubt
a consequence of the explicit deference that is written into the
other doctrines governing constitutional claims brought by
incarcerated people.314 In non-Eighth Amendment constitutional
challenges to prison policies, the Supreme Court has gone to great
pains to explain the complexity and intractability of the problems
309. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
310. Id. at 859.
311. Id.
312. See Dolovich, supra note 184, at 890. The Farmer Court also goes one to explain
why, in its view, the “objective” deliberate indifference test developed in City of Canton v.
Harris is inapplicable in prison conditions cases. See Godfrey, supra note 61, at 172-74, for
a discussion of the Farmer Court’s treatment of Harris.
313. Glidden, supra note 184, at 1832-33 (describing how and in what frequency
federal courts defer to the judgment of prison officials in prison conditions cases).
314. Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 140-42 (discussing the doctrine of deference
in certain constitutional claims brought by incarcerated people).
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confronting those who run American prisons.315 Using those
justifications, the Court has developed a doctrine that explicitly
accounts for its desire to largely defer to the choices made by
prison officials in running American prisons.316
In the context of the Eighth Amendment, the Court has
expressly rejected a doctrine that openly incorporates deference
into the relevant standard.317 Nonetheless, “in practice, both it
and the lower courts often defer to prison officials in analyzing
claims of cruel and unusual punishment.”318 Moreover, the
deliberate indifference standard itself—even if only implicitly—
developed from a clear concern that a standard that did not require
a showing of intent might lead to increased liability of prison
officials and increased judicial intrusion into the operation of
prisons.319 As the prior section outlines, the current Eighth
Amendment doctrine places undue focus on the subjective intent
of prison officials because of a misplaced concern of ensuring that
conditions being challenged in prison conditions cases amounted
to punishment.320 But this undue focus can create situations
where ongoing harms inside prisons go uncorrected either
because an incarcerated person cannot prove the subjective intent

315. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) (explaining the
policy justifications that inform the doctrine of deference as follows: “the problems of
prisons in America are complex and intractable, and . . . not readily susceptible of resolution
by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive
branches of government . . . . Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal
courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities.”).
316. Bianchi & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 7 (describing the Turner standard and the
Court’s view of the need for a deferential standard); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
89-91 (1987).
317. See Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 141 (noting that “the Court has expressly
rejected reasonable-relationship review for Eighth Amendment claims, finding that ‘the full
protections of the eighth amendment most certainly remain in force [in prison]. The whole
point of the amendment is to protect persons convicted of crimes.’ Accordingly, ‘deference
to the findings of state prison officials in the context of the eighth amendment would reduce
that provision to a nullity in precisely the context where it is most necessary.’”) (quoting
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511 (2005)).
318. Id. at 141-42.
319. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835, 844-45 (1994).
320. See supra notes 299-306, 310 and accompanying text.
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of an individual prison official or the institutional intent of the
prison system itself.321
The problem of uncorrected ongoing harms in prison
conditions cases is playing out acutely in judicial responses to
Eighth Amendment claims relating to the COVID-19
pandemic.322 A close look at the decisions of federal courts in
these cases reveals a judiciary concerned with maintaining its
deference to prison officials, even in the face of ongoing harm and
suffering.323 Take, for example, the decision of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas on the
Arkansas prison system’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic
in the Cummins Unit, discussed at the beginning of this Part.324
In that case, Judge Kristine Baker explicitly acknowledged that
the number of infected people in Arkansas’s prisons (incarcerated
people and staff alike) had increased during the “few weeks” the
case had been pending prior to her decision on the plaintiffs’
request for a preliminary injunction.325
Despite this
acknowledgment, and a recognition that the plaintiffs had
presented evidence of staff not wearing masks and gloves,326
incarcerated people not wearing masks as directed,327 a
prohibition on alcohol-based hand sanitizer,328 a months-long
delay in implementing guidance from the Centers for Disease
Control on social distancing,329 the denial of care and testing of
incarcerated people displaying COVID-19 symptoms,330 a lack of
follow-up care for those with COVID-19,331 a lack of aid from
prison staff who observe incarcerated people “too weak to care

321. See Glidden, supra note 184, at 1833-37 (describing the problems with ongoing
harms and institutional intent under the current Eighth Amendment conditions test); see also
Godfrey, supra note 61, at 186 (discussing the difficulty of proving institutional intent in
Eighth Amendment conditions cases seeking injunctive relief).
322. See Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 142.
323. Id. at 142 n.99 (detailing cases wherein courts explicitly deferred to prison
officials’ judgment and response to the pandemic, despite rising infection and death rates).
324. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
325. Frazier v. Kelley, 460 F. Supp. 3d 799, 842 (E.D. Ark. 2020).
326. Id. at 838.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 839.
329. Id. at 839-40.
330. Frazier, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 841.
331. Id.
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for themselves or to seek medical care,”332 and the presence of
positive, asymptomatic staff at work,333 the court declined to
grant the incarcerated plaintiffs preliminary relief.334 In reaching
this conclusion, the court determined the plaintiffs could not meet
their burden to establish deliberate indifference335 and declined to
intrude “into the core activities of the state’s prison system.”336
At the time Judge Baker issued her order on May 19, 2020, at
least four incarcerated people had already died in Arkansas’s
prisons.337 Less than a month later, seven more people had
died.338 And while the incarcerated plaintiffs are still litigating
their case, the death rate in Arkansas prisons has continued to rise,
with more than fifty people now dead.339
***
Eighth Amendment doctrine is built to sustain judicial
indifference to the suffering, harm, and death of the
incarcerated.340 The doctrine ignores the Eighth Amendment’s
textual purpose: to prevent cruel and unusual punishments by the
State.341 In our current criminal system, criminal courts mete out
punishment as a sentence of incarceration, usually for a term of
years.342 That term of years is meant to be served in selfcontained societies created by the state—i.e., prisons.343 While
those sentences do not have to be comfortable,344 the conditions

332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 846.
335. Frazier, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 837 (noting that “the Court concludes that plaintiffs
have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the subjective prong of their Eighth
Amendment claims”).
336. Id. at 846.
337. See generally id.; see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
340. See Godfrey, supra note 61, at 157.
341. Id. at 158-59 (discussing scholarly debate around the intent of the drafters in both
England and the United States); see also supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing
scholars’ acceptance that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was intended to
prohibit certain methods of punishment).
342. Glossary of Federal Sentencing- Related Terms, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, (Sept.
2021), [https://perma.cc/M6AZ-UGV5].
343. Id.
344. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).
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in which they are served cannot be inhumane nor can they
fundamentally alter the punishment meted out by the state.345
However, under current doctrine, inhumane prison
conditions will be found perfectly constitutional by the federal
courts so long as an incarcerated plaintiff is unable to prove that
prison officials knowingly imposed those conditions despite
knowledge of the risk of harm.346 This outcome can be seen in
the myriad of cases around the country challenging prison
conditions since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. In
those cases, plaintiffs have presented ample evidence that the selfcontained societies created by the State have become so toxic that
they are acting as death traps, thereby transforming the statesanctioned punishment into an extrajudicial death sentence for
some incarcerated people, even in prison systems where officials
are taking steps to mitigate the risk posed by the virus.347
Such a result should not be sustained under the Eighth
Amendment. But the COVID-19 pandemic has seen this result
upheld time-and-again because Eighth Amendment doctrine
encapsulates an inherent indifference to suffering that cannot be
attributed to the intentions of an individual defendant.348 Even
where prison officials are well-motivated individuals, conditions
that pose a risk of death should be unconstitutional. Under our
current system, they are not because the doctrine governing
conditions claims is inherently indifferent to the suffering of
incarcerated people. Thus, the doctrine creates the second strand
of indifference that primed American prison systems for disaster
during the COVID-19 pandemic: judicial indifference.
III. SOCIETAL INDIFFERENCE: APATHY TO THE
INCARCERATED
The final strand of indifference that has allowed for the
harms experienced by incarcerated people during the course of
the COVID-19 pandemic is the general societal apathy toward
people behind bars. The causes of this indifference are myriad
345.
346.
347.
348.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
Id. at 829, 834.
See supra Section III.B; see also supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
See Frazier v. Kelley, 460 F. Supp. 3d 799, 837 (E.D. Ark. 2020).
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and complex but can in part be attributed to three overlapping
realities of the American carceral system. First, American prisons
are opaque institutions, and the lack of transparency of most
American prisons means that society remains largely ignorant of
what is going on behind bars at any given time. Second,
American prisons are filled with people who are generally
marginalized by society. Finally, the culture of fear that
permeates the American imagination allows society to take the
view that people behind bars “are bad guys, just getting what they
deserve.”349
A. A Lack of Transparency
Mainstream American society has little understanding of
what goes on inside American prison walls due to the prison
system’s lack of transparency.350 While the United States
incarcerates nearly 2.2 million people, “the indignities suffered
each day by the human beings living in American prisons and jails
occur largely out of sight from the general public.”351 This lack
of transparency deprives the American public of the ability to
critically assess whether the societal attitude of “they deserve
what they get” actually withstands scrutiny when the public learns
what “what they get” actually means for incarcerated individuals.
In other words, the American public has little means to examine
whether the punishment occurring through incarceration matches
the imagined punishment meted out at a criminal sentencing. For
example, as Andrea Armstrong acutely observes:
[i]t would be barbaric for a judge to order a person to be
sexually violated as a consequence of a crime. Is it any less
barbaric if it happens incidental to lawful imprisonment?
The same could be said for people denied medical and
mental health care. Serving a certain amount of time in jail

349. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 1.
350. Andrea Craig Armstrong, The Missing Link: Jail and Prison Conditions in
Criminal Justice Reform, 80 LA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2019) (arguing that “[j]ail and prison
conditions matter because they are involuntary homes for millions of people without
meaningful public oversight, transparency, or accountability”).
351. Godfrey, supra note 68, at 1115.
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or prison is the intended punishment, not death or injury by
neglect.352

While we can of course not know how the American public
might react if it knew of the true conditions within the nation’s
prisons, we may never learn if prisons remain “the black boxes of
our society.”353
One thing we have learned, however, from the Black Lives
Matter movement, is that when brave passersby record police
officers and make those recordings public, people start to pay
attention.354 “But what about places in the United States where
people can’t have cellphone cameras and the state-sponsored
violence against Black people is often ignored or never revealed
to the public? This happens in prisons all the time.”355 What is
going on in prisons is not visible to the public in the same way
that the tragic killings of Black and brown men has been in recent
years, but it is equally as problematic.356 But society has granted
itself “permission to look away from the truth” because it views
incarcerated people as “disposable.”357
B. The American Underclass
The reason incarcerated people are often viewed as
“disposable” stems from the country’s long-standing belief that
social problems arise from individual moral failings rather than
structural and societal problems.358 By attributing social
problems to individual faults, American society has long turned
to segregation and detention to remove these so-called “inferior”

352. Armstrong, supra note 353, at 18.
353. Dewan, supra note 68.
354. Johnny Perez, As We Work to Make Black Lives Matter, Let’s Remember That
Incarcerated Lives Matter, Too, USA TODAY (Aug. 30, 2020), [https://perma.cc/GN8FYGJK].
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Laura I. Appelman, Pandemic Eugenics: Discrimination, Disability, & Detention
During COVID-19, 67 LOYOLA L. REV. 329, 335 (2021) (noting that “[e]ugenic theory was
closely intertwined [in] the late nineteenth century idea that social problems, including
insanity, dependency, poverty, and disability, were fundamentally individual and moral in
nature.”).
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populations from mainstream American society.359 This trend
continues today: it is no secret that the vast majority of people
that we lock up in this country are poor people and people of color
who belong to historically disadvantaged groups.360
Class and classism matter here; this isn’t something that
springs up out of nowhere. We treat being poor, being from
the inner city, being from the country as reasons to be
ashamed even though no one controls the circumstances of
their own birth. We look at places that are being starved of
resources, where being tough is a matter of survival, and then
we say, “[i]n order to have safety, financial stability, housing
that isn’t subpar, you have to be willing to cut away
everything that made you,” and when some people can’t or
won’t do that we punish them for it. It’s assimilation, not
acculturation, that is demanded of people who are already
sacrificing, already making hard choices.361

By creating this class of other—of groups of people who are
faulted for the circumstances of their birth—American society has
created an underclass of people who are viewed and treated as
less valuable by society as a whole.362 Because incarcerated
people fall squarely within this underclass, society has remained
largely indifferent to their plight during the COVID-19 pandemic.
To the extent the incarcerated underclass saw any reprieve
during the pandemic, the amnesty was limited to only those who
could be viewed as “non-violent.” This limitation is driven by the
359. Id. at 336, 108 (“From the very beginning of the United States, segregation and
detention have been used to control those on the margins: the poor (in almshouses,
workhouses, and ghettos), minorities (in convict labor farms and correctional institutions),
and those who are disabled (in cages, asylums, and hospitals).”); see also Sharon Dolovich,
Mass Incarceration, Meet COVID-19, 11/16/20 U. CHI. LAW REV. ONLINE *4, *6-*7 (2020)
(noting that the individualist nature of our narratives around who is deserving of punishment
leave “us collectively unable to reckon with the [] drivers of criminal activity” and “blind us
to the community costs of a default carceral response”).
360. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 74, at 4 (noting that the “carceral state has
disproportionately hurt African American men. But it also has been targeting a rising number
of people from other historically disadvantaged groups,” including women, Hispanics, and
poor whites); Dolovich, supra note 363 at 5 (noting that it “is impossible to disentangle . . .
the structural racism that has driven the glaring overincarceration of African Americans and
other people of color and helped shape the brutality of the American carceral experience”).
361. MIKKI KENDALL, HOOD FEMINISM: NOTES FROM THE WOMEN THAT A
MOVEMENT FORGOT 139 (2020).
362. Appelman, supra note 358, at 331-33 (attributing our lack of care for this
underclass during the COVID-19 pandemic to long-standing American eugenic philosophy).

1 GODFREY.MAN.FIN COPY 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/13/21 2:43 PM

420

Vol. 74:3

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

longstanding dichotomy made between “violent” and
“nonviolent” crime, a dubious distinction that is driven in large
part by the American culture of fear.
C. A Culture of Fear
While some incarcerated people were able to secure release
during the COVID-19 pandemic through compassionate release
efforts, executive clemency actions, expedited parole
proceedings, and home confinement orders, mass release efforts
were often stymied by fear of releasing people who committed
“violent” crimes.363 But the “violent” versus “nonviolent”
dichotomy that characterizes much of the American criminal
punishment system is largely misleading, and it reinforces the
racial stereotypes upon which the criminal punishment system is
built.
First, the label “violent” is often applied to crimes that many
people might not actually believe to be violent.364 For example,
in some jurisdictions “failing a urine test repeatedly” is classified
as a violent crime.365 Moreover, even for those individuals who
did commit a violent crime, “data shows that most people age out
of ‘violent crime,’” and recidivism rates for older people are
diminishingly low.366
Not only is the “fearmongering” rhetoric used to describe
people accused of violent crimes unsupported by data, it can also
be used to reinforce racial stereotypes.367 Social science research
demonstrates that Black people are not only more likely to be
stopped by police, but they are also more likely to be detained
pretrial, charged with more serious crimes, and sentenced more
363. April Rodriguez, We Won’t Address Our Mass Incarceration Crisis Until We
Rethink Our Approach To “Violent Crime”, ACLU (June 15, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/4T7W-9C5W] (explaining how “many judges have dismissed release as a
viable option for people accused or convicted of violent charges”).
364. Eli Hager, When “Violent Offenders” Commit Nonviolent Crimes, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 3, 2019), [https://perma.cc/3LSB-DTSJ] (explaining that “many
of the ‘violent offenders’ in U.S. prisons are there for crimes not everyone would classify as
violent,” including “purse snatching,” “manufacture of methamphetamines,” and “theft of
drugs”).
365. Rodriguez, supra note 363.
366. Id.
367. Id.

1 GODFREY.MAN.FIN COPY 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021

CREATING CAUTIONARY TALES

12/13/21 2:43 PM

421

harshly than white people.368 While these disparate outcomes
may not always “be the result of overt racism,” they often arise
from the implicit bias of prosecutors, judges, and juries.369 “This
means that what society chooses to prosecute as violent is heavily
influenced by race. Standard definitions of what and who we
consider dangerous are not natural or self-evident; they are
made.”370
Thus, unless and until society works to overcome the false
dichotomy created by speaking of incarcerated people in terms of
those who committed “violent” offenses and those who
committed “non-violent” offenses, the culture of fear that
surrounds “violent” crimes will prevent societal recognition of the
humanity of all people behind bars.371 Unless and until we can
overcome this culture and rhetoric of fear, societal indifference to
the lives of incarcerated people will continue to flourish by
allowing society to ignore the individualized harms being
suffered by people behind bars.
***
The institutional and judicial indifference described in Parts
I and II of this Article is allowed to perpetuate because of an
overarching societal indifference to the harms suffered by people
behind bars. That societal indifference is driven in part by the
lack of transparency inherent to prison systems. But even as
advocates and journalists have made strides in recent years to
expose what is happening behind bars,372 greater transparency has
not fully eradicated this societal indifference. This is because
such indifference is tied to broader cultural attitudes toward
marginalized groups and the culture of fear created by and which
sustains unwarranted racial stereotypes. Until this indifference is
addressed, the other strands of indifference that created a carceral
368. Elizabeth Hinton, LeShae Henderson, & Cindy Reed, An Unjust Burden: The
Disparate Treatment of Black Americans in the Criminal Justice System, VERA EVIDENCE
BRIEF 1-9 (May 2018).
369. Id. at 7.
370. Rodriguez, supra note 363.
371. Id.
372. See, e.g., Nicole B. Godfrey, Suffragist Prisoners and the Importance of
Protecting Prisoner Protests, 53 AKRON L. REV. 279, 280 n. 7 (2019) (providing examples
of recent exposés about what is happening behind bars).
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system ripe for widespread harm in the face of emergencies like
the COVID-19 pandemic will continue to persist.
CONCLUSION
From the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, incarcerated
people and their advocates knew that the pandemic would prove
devastating to the incarcerated unless the prisons, the courts, and
society took dramatic and immediate steps to depopulate the
prisons.373 Yet, the institutional indifference of the prison
systems themselves, the judicial indifference of the doctrine
governing incarcerated people’s requests for emergency relief,
and the societal indifference of the American public and its
attitude toward the incarcerated combined to make depopulation
efforts nearly impossible.
In describing these three interwoven causes of the failure to
protect incarcerated lives during the pandemic, I used the term
indifference purposefully. Derived from the constitutional
doctrine meant to protect people from cruel and unusual
incarceration (the punishment most utilized by the American
criminal system), the word indifference holds special meaning in
the carceral context. Under the current state of the law, an
incarcerated person can only gain protection from cruel and
unusual prison conditions when they can demonstrate that the
cause of those conditions is the deliberate indifference of prison
officials.374 But what I’ve tried to demonstrate in the above
discussion is that the entire carceral system is built upon and
sustained by these three strands of indifference: institutional,
judicial, and societal. And because these three strands of
indifference are structural in nature, it can be no surprise that they
operate to create cruel and unusual results—i.e., unnecessary
harms—in the face of an emergency like the pandemic.
Ultimately, the continued existence of these three strands of
indifference—despite demonstrable evidence of the daily
suffering occurring within our modern punishment regime—

373. Kaste, supra note 13; see also Stacy Weiner, Prison Should Not Be a COVID-19
Death Sentence, AAMC (Aug. 27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/QLN4-DYFZ].
374. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-36 (1994).
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lends itself to the conclusion that they are nothing short of
deliberate.
While this Article has been largely diagnostic and
descriptive in its assessment of the strands of indifference that
combined to create the cautionary tales of American prisons, I
plan to provide prescriptive policy and jurisprudential reforms in
future work aimed at eliminating these strands of indifference.
But, any reform efforts must be informed by the lessons of
abolitionists, who have explained to us that reform efforts “must
be a cultural intervention,”375 that the modern prison developed
from reform efforts rooted “in the paradigmatic national power
relations of racial chattel” and has remained “stubbornly brutal,
violent and inhumane” through successive reform efforts,376 that
conceptions of justice must expose hypocrisy “entrenched in
existing legal practices,”377 and that a radical reorganization of
American society is necessary to truly dismantle the “issues of
systemic and structural racism [that] should have been addressed
more than 100 years ago.”378 If we are to truly dismantle the
strands of interwoven indifference that allowed American prisons
to become the epicenters of the pandemic, we must take seriously
the calls of these abolitionists and think critically about how we
can build a system of justice that might allow us to avoid future
cautionary tales.

375. Patrisse Cullors, Abolition and Reparations: Histories of Resistance,
Transformative Justice, and Accountability, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1684, 1694 (2019).
376. Dylan Rodríguez, Abolition as a Praxis of Human Being: A Foreword, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 1575, 1582, 1597 (2019) (quoting Mariame Kaba, Prison Reform’s in Vogue and
Other Strange Things . . ., TRUTHOUT (Mar. 21, 2014), [https://perma.cc/T5HP-CXSN]).
377. Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613,
1615 (2019).
378. Angela Y. Davis, Why Arguments Against Abolition Inevitably Fail, MEDIUM
(Oct. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/SE9S-8SV9].

